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Abstract 
The role of the newspaper Press in the development of aviation has barely been 
examined by historians, particularly in relation to the concurrent development of the 
aeroplane and airship in the early 20th Century. Most studies, such as John 
Swinfield’s (2012) Airship Design, Development and Disaster, focus on the technical 
details and capabilities of the technology or on political-economic concerns. 
However, in attempting to explain the choice of the aeroplane over the airship by 
both civilian and military organisations by the early 1920’s, these studies have not 
considered the role of contemporary newspapers in mediating and moulding 
decisions about Government aviation policies. 
The ability of the early 20th Century Press Barons to influence British governments 
has been well documented by Curran& Seaton (2010). This influence was recognised 
by many politicians who sought the support of the Press for their campaigns. Lord 
Northcliffe, owner of The Times and Daily Mail, was well known for his interest in 
aviation and sought to influence government policy in regard to aerial defences 
against continental powers. His influence was demonstrated in the Shell Crisis of 
1915, when the intervention of his papers led to the downfall of the Asquith 
government. 
By drawing on recently digitized Press sources this thesis explores the role of the 
press in debating the comparative merits of the airship and aeroplane, covering the 
periods before, during and after the Great War. I argue that as a strong advocate of 
aviation, Lord Northcliffe attempted to use his newspapers to influence public 
opinion and Government policy in favour of developing both heavier and lighter than 
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air technologies, especially given the evidence of their complementary strengths 
during the war. I thus show that newspaper reports and articles may have had a 
significant effect on the evaluation of the airship in Britain, which, contributed to its 
eventual demise. 
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 “I feel that I can do better work if I maintain my 
independence and am not gagged by a loyalty I do not 
feel towards the whole of your administration.” 
Lord Northcliffe to Lloyd George - 16 November 19171 
 
   
                                            
1 The Times, 16 Nov. 1917, p.7. 
From “The Worlds Work”, December 1908, p.10948. 
http://archive.org/stream/worldswork17gard#page/10948/mode/2up 
Figure 1:Portrait of Alfred Harmsworth, 1st Viscount 
Northcliffe, by Gertrude Kasebier 
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1.1 Introduction 
The history of early 20th Century aviation has had a tendency to focus primarily on 
technical factors such as the performance of aircraft, in terms of size, speed, carrying 
capacity and range. Writers such as David Edgerton treat the adoption of the 
aeroplane by Edwardian Britain as a fait accompli. Indeed until recently the airship 
has been considered a technological dead end, only worthy of study in order to 
explain the apparently inevitable dominance of the aeroplane in both military and 
civil aviation. 
Yet, at the end of the First World War this dominance was by no means assured, let 
alone self-evident. Between 1914 and 1921 a total of 244 airships had been 
constructed in Britain,2 having flown approximately 89,000 hours, covering a 
distance of at least 2.25 million miles.3 Wartime experience had demonstrated that 
airships, particularly the large rigid airships such as the German Zeppelin, had 
superior range and carrying capacity to contemporary land and seaplanes; offering 
the British Government the possibility of regular aerial communications with distant 
corners of the Empire. However, by the end of 1921 airship development in Britain 
had been largely abandoned.  
Where traditional histories of aviation have focused on technological and political 
arguments in order to explain this phenomenon, my thesis adopts a theme from 
media history to examine the role played by the newspaper press in the comparative 
                                            
2 Abbott 1989, p.136. 
3 Whale n.d, p.73. 
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fate of the airship and aeroplane. Specifically I look at the role of the Northcliffe 
Press in moulding the development of aviation technology in the early 20th Century. 
By 1908, the ‘Press Baron’ Lord Northcliffe controlled a significant Press Empire 
comprised of The Times, Daily Mail and the Observer, which he soon utilized in 
attempting to influence the British population and government of the importance of 
aviation for the maintenance and defence of the British Empire. In light of the 
contribution of the Northcliffe Press to the downfall of the Asquith government in 
1916 through its handling of the ‘shell crisis’ in the munitions industry, my thesis 
asks: how far did his Press-mediated power extend to influence both British patterns 
of aviation and its relation to government? 
1.2 Literature review  
This review is divided into three sections, first books relating to media history, 
secondly books relating to the early history of aviation in Britain and its impact on 
British society. The final section deals with the mainstream histories of the airship, 
highlighting the traditional focus on technical, financial and political factors in 
explaining the fate of the airship in Britain. 
The mainstream historical literature on the Press, such as Curran and Seaton’s Power 
without Responsibility, (7thed), largely avoids the First World War focussing instead 
on the attempts by Press Barons such as Lord Northcliffe to influence politics during 
the 1920s; this is probably due to the assumption that government wartime 
censorship of the press might distort the overall story of the power of the civilian 
press when viewed in the longer term. Such factors are explored in Tania Rose’s 
Aspects of Political Censorship 1914-1918, although, without touching on aviation 
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history. Rose instead focuses primarily on the impact of censorship on political 
protest and anti-war activists.4  
Peter Broks, Media Science before the Great War, (1996) deals the role of the press 
in the popularisation of science in late Victorian and early Edwardian Britain. Broks’ 
understanding of the scope of the media is limited making no mention of daily 
newspapers such as The Times or Daily Mail. He instead focuses on periodicals such 
as Pearson’s Magazine and Tit-bits that were “more concerned with the curious 
strange and the bizarre” than they were with science.5 Broks thus, does not consider 
developments in technology, but focuses instead on topics such as the relationship 
between science and religion, nature and evolution. 
The importance of the press in the public acceptance of new technologies has been 
considered by historians such Graeme Gooday in Domesticating electricity (2008). 
Chapters three and four focus on issue of danger and safety in electricity using press 
reports to demonstrate the manner in which the press attempted to influence the 
debate on domestic electricity during the late 19th Century.6  However, the role of 
the press has not been nearly so well examined in relation to technologies seen as 
being primarily military in nature, such as aviation. 
                                            
4 Rose 1995, pp, 42-100. 
5 Brok 1996, p.27. 
6 Gooday 2008, pp. 61-120.  
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Alfred Gollin’s, The Impact of Air Power on the British People and their Government, 
1909-14,7 is a rare example of a volume which makes the connection between the 
Northcliffe press and the early years of aviation in Britain. Gollin shows the attempts 
by Northcliffe and other elements of the press to influence government policy in the 
direction of a more practical and less theoretical approach to aviation as well as 
documenting attempts by government ministers such as Viscount Haldane to 
harness the press in support of the government’s aerial policy.  
Although Gollin also deals more generally with the media reporting of British 
developments in aviation, he only covers the period up until 1914 and while much 
has been written about aerial conflict during the First World War by authors such as 
Joseph Morris8 and John Morrow,9 they do not consider the impact of aerial warfare 
and the way in which it was reported in the press, on the attitudes of the British 
public, military and politicians on the aircraft industry in Britain. 
Turning to the civilian experiences of aerial warfare, in, At Home and Under Fire10, 
Susan Grayzel considers the impact of air raids on British society in both the First and 
Second World Wars. Grayzel points to the experience of the British population during 
the First World War as being fundamental in restricting spending on armaments, 
particularly on aviation during the 1920’s. However, despite making use of 
                                            
7 Gollin 1989 
8 German Air Raids on Britain, 1914-1918. (1925). 
9 The Great War in the Air, Military Aviation from 1909 to 1921. (1993). 
10 Grayzel 2012. 
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newspaper sources, she does not fully examine the impact of the press reports on 
British attitudes to aviation during the interwar period or its implications for the 
development of civil aviation. Instead Grayzel focuses on the impact of the air raids 
on the post war armaments treaties, such as the Geneva Disarmament conference in 
1932.11  
Moving to the conventional histories of the airship, Douglas Robinsons, Giants in the 
sky (1973) focuses primarily on the German Zeppelins as the ‘original’ airships, 
contrasting British designs as inferior imitations. In a broader vein Robinson views 
the airship and the aeroplane as being in open competition with each other, arguing 
that whatever the early advantages the airship held these were soon taken over by 
the aeroplane. Robinson’s focus on the technical details of airship design excludes 
political, financial or social considerations from significantly influencing the fate of 
the airship. 
The same focus on design history rather than social history can be found in John 
Swinfield’s Airship, design, development and disaster (2012). Swinfield charts the 
history of the airship from the early attempts in Germany in the late 19th Century to 
the giants of the 1930s. Swinfield examines the roles played by different people, 
such as Count Von Zeppelin, and organisations, such as the Royal Air Force, in the 
development and eventual demise of the airship. While Swinfield covers the political 
intrigues surrounding the British airship service, he does not consider the role of the 
press in the formation of public opinion either in favour of or against the airship.  
                                            
11 Grayzel 2012, pp. 149-176. 
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Patrick Abbott’s The British Airship at War, 1914-1918, (1989) focuses on the 
operational experiences of various classes of British Naval airships during the Great 
War. Abbott focuses on the tactics used by these airships against German U-boats 
and assesses the effectiveness of the airships in this defensive role. He concludes 
that the airships performed a vital role in the protection of British shipping, but one 
which remained largely unknown to the British public due to official Admiralty policy 
which “decreed that no details of airship construction or activity should be 
revealed[.]”12  However, despite this Abbott does not comment on the effect of this 
news blackout on British perceptions of the airship. This dissertation thus picks up 
where Abbott left off to map the very selective reporting of the airship in the press, 
and exploring how far that reporting – or lack thereof – was responsible in part for its 
disappearance from British skies. 
One text which focuses on the political and economic factors of British airship 
development is James Neilson’s 2008 PhD thesis, Flights of Imagination: Episodes in 
the Development of the British Navigable Airship 1900-1930. In this thesis Neilson 
focuses primarily on the political and economic factors which effected the 
development of the airship in Britain, paying particular attention to the relations 
between the Royal Navy, the Army and when applicable the Royal Air Force. In 
attempting to place the development of the airship within its social and political 
context Neilson largely ignores the technical issues favoured by other airship 
historians. However, while making use of journals and periodicals such as the Daily 
                                            
12 Abbott 1989, p.3. 
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Sketch, a Manchester based tabloid Newspaper, Neilson fails to seriously consider 
the importance of the major newspapers such as the Times and Daily Mail in 
reflecting and examining public reactions to aviation related issues. Although, having 
failed to make use of these newspapers, Neilson does point out that Lord Northcliffe 
had appointed a ‘special correspondent’ to report on aviation related issues for both 
the Times and the Daily Mail13, thus indicating an awareness of the importance of 
the press. 
A further text which examines social factors in the development of ‘modern’ 
technologies, such as the airship, is Bernhard Rieger’s 2005, Technology and the 
culture of modernity in Britain and Germany, 1890-1945. Rieger explores the 
development of oceanic liners such as the Titanic, film and cinema, and aviation 
technologies such as the aeroplane and airship, during the early years of the 20th 
Century. Rather than focusing on the technical aspects of these technologies, Rieger 
instead sets out to demonstrate the importance of these  new and innovative 
technologies as symbols of modernity in Britain and Germany. He highlights the 
contrasting public meanings assigned to these technologies and the ways in which 
these impacted on, the means and reasons by which Britain and Germany sought to 
develop them.  
Chapter three focuses on accidents involving the modern technologies of aeroplanes, 
airships and ocean liners and the ways in which these accidents were viewed by the 
general public both in Britain and Germany. In terms of aviation Rieger focuses on 
                                            
13 Neilson 2008, p.74. 
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incidents such as the loss of the R101 in 1929 and the Hindenburg in 1937, noting 
that the press had a tendency to focus on those incidents involving significant loss of 
life, while ignoring those in which safety systems had been effective in preventing 
any significant casualties.14 However, the book makes no mention of earlier airship 
disasters in Britain either before or after the First World War. Two incidents which 
generated a high level of interest in the British press were the destruction of the 
Mayfly in 1911 and the loss of the R38 over Hull in 1921. While the Mayfly incident 
did not result in the huge loss of life that Rieger feels to be necessary to influence 
ensure public interest the incident was followed closely by the British press, on a 
local and national level. In addition to this, while he makes use of press reports from 
papers such as the Times and the Manchester Guardian, Rieger does not attempt to 
assess the impact of these reports on contemporary readers nor does he consider 
the possibility of the reports influencing political decisions. 
1.3 Methodology and Sources 
In this thesis I build on the work of Gollin, Abbott and Rieger in order to demonstrate 
the importance of the newspaper press to the development of aviation in Britain 
between 1909 and 1922, particularly in respect to the airship. I access a variety of 
newspapers from the Gale Newsvault and the British Newspaper Archives, searching 
by date for key milestones in aviation history such as the wreck of the Mayfly in 
1911. I then conduct a page by page search for up to two weeks on either side of the 
relevant date. This allows me to deal with one issue with digitised collections 
                                            
14 Rieger 2005, p.71. 
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identified by James Mussell: While searching for key words and terms allows the 
researcher instant access to articles containing that information. However, that 
information alone does not show how it fits within the paper as a whole.15 Searching 
on a page by page basis allows me to build up a picture of the editorial opinion on 
the importance of the topic which can be shown by its location within the paper and 
whether or not the article is spread out over multiple connected columns and pages 
or distributed throughout the paper.  
My major focus is on The Times which, according to Thompson (2000), was widely 
regarded as being “a voice of official government opinion.” Moreover, this 
newspaper was certainly viewed by Northcliffe himself as being more influential on 
the government than his other papers.16 In order to understand the ways in which 
newspapers report on events in aviation I have also examined the issue of framing. 
Dietram A. Scheufle defines framing as a central organisational idea or storyline that 
provides meaning to events. Scheufle notes that frames provide “working routines” 
for journalists allowing them to quickly and efficiently “identify and classify 
information and “to package it for […] relay to their audiences. (Gitlin 1980, p.7)” 
Finally Dietram also notes that while this concept of framing can include the “intent 
of the sender” this may not be conscious.17  Due to the mercurial nature of Lord 
Northcliffe it is difficult to assess the importance of framing to my overall argument. 
However, there is evidence that stories related to aviation have a generally positive 
                                            
15 Mussell 2012, pp.56-61. 
16 Thompson 2000, p.145. 
17 Deitram 1999, p.106. 
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spin, even when discussing fatal accidents. I also examine a combination of Hansard, 
Cabinet (CAB), Admiralty (ADM) and Air Ministry (Air) documents using key term 
searches in order to examine government and military attitudes towards aviation 
and their reactions to reports on aviation in the press. 
1.4 Thesis Outline 
In chapter two I examine the state of aviation in Britain between 1908 and 1914, 
particularly the competition between airships and aeroplanes. I also examine the 
interactions between the government and the newspaper press, particularly those 
papers owned by Lord Northcliffe. I also examine the impact of the ‘phantom airship 
scares’ of 1909 and 1913 and the way in which the press reports on the subject had 
attempted to persuade the public to call for greater investment in British aviation. In 
addition to this I examine the press reporting on the development and destruction of 
Britain’s first rigid airship, the ‘Mayfly’ in 1911, and the impact this had on the 
development of the airship in Britain. Finally I consider the causes of the renewed 
interest displayed in airship development in Britain immediately prior to the First 
World War, including newspaper articles and official reports from the military/naval 
attaches in Berlin on the latest German developments in airships. 
In chapter three I examine the impact of press censorship on the reporting of 
German air raids on Britain during the Great War. Noting the changes in style and 
content of the press reports throughout the course of the war and the ways in which 
these reports helped to shape the perception of the airship amongst different 
- 21 - 
sectors18 of the British population. I also examine the difference in reporting on the 
Gotha raids of 1917-18 in comparison to the Zeppelin raids during 1915-1918 and 
the way in which these differences shaped official policy in favour of the aeroplane 
over the airship. Finally I examine the limited reporting on the work of British airships 
during the First World War and the ways in which the lack of publically available 
information on their wartime role and activities contributed to the negative wartime 
image of the airship. 
In chapter four I examine the development of the airship in the post-war period 
between 1919 and 1922. I begin by studying key events in the development of the 
airship during this period, both in terms of achievements, such as the transatlantic 
crossing of the R.34, and disasters such as the loss of the R.38 over Hull. I examine 
the ways in which these events were reported in the press and the impact of these 
reports on the perception of the airship by the British Government, armed forces and 
the general population. 
 I also examine the role of the newly formed Royal Air Force and its parent body the 
Air Ministry in the decision to abandon airship development in Britain, using 
newspaper sources to expand on Neilson’s work in this area. While the Air Ministry 
was not against the airship, ministers such as Winston Churchill viewed it as being a 
competitor for scarce funding as well as potentially providing an opening for the 
Royal Navy to regain control of its air arm, which would have threatened the survival 
of the RAF as an independent force.  
                                            
18 Government, Military, Naval and Civilian. 
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1.5 Conclusion 
I will show that the traditional narratives of aviation in Britain are not sufficient to 
explain the decisions by the British government and the Royal Air Force in the early 
1920s to develop the aeroplane instead of the airship for both civilian and military 
uses. At the end of the First World War, when judged on purely technical grounds, 
the aeroplane and airship were often viewed as complementary technologies, both 
serving distinct roles within aviation. Indeed, during the immediate post-war period, 
this view was regularly expounded by well-known British advocates of the airship 
such as General Maitland19 and Major Scott.20 Maitland had suggested that airships 
would be used for long distance journeys landing at hubs and people would continue 
to their destinations by aeroplane.21  
A study of Post-World War One financial and political intrigues does not however, 
suffice to explain how the aeroplane came to be the dominant means of air transport 
in Britain. While as Neilson demonstrates, it is clear that politics played a significant 
role in the decision to abandon development of the airship, politics cannot operate 
in a vacuum. During the early 20th Century the Press Barons such as Lord Northcliffe22 
realised the power of the press to shape public opinion and influence Government 
                                            
19 Jones 2004. 
20 Richards 2004. 
21 Swinfield 2012, pp.75-76. 
22 Boyce 2004. 
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policy, a realisation which was shared by politicians such as Lloyd George23, but 
ignored by others such as Asquith24 – to his cost in losing office after intensive press 
coverage of the shell crisis in 1916.  
Overall this thesis will examine the nature of reporting on aviation in papers such as 
The Times, and will demonstrate the perceived potential of the Edwardian press to 
influence public opinion, as well as government and military decisions, on innovative 
technological matters such as aviation. I will also show that the British Government 
appreciated this potential and that some attempts were made to use it to secure 
public opinion. However, like the technological, political and financial arguments put 
forwards by mainstream aviation historians, my thesis avoids reductive single factor 
explanations for the decision to abandon development of the airship in Britain.  
                                            
23 Morgan 2004. 
24 Mathew 2004. 
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Chapter 2 
Britain and the Scareship:1909 – 1914 
 
 
 “There is quite a natural dislike in Government offices 
to anything new. We all know that when torpedoes, 
smokeless powder, breech-loading rifles, and other 
improvements in the art of war came in, it took some 
time before the War Offices were inclined to look at the 
inventions; and, as a rule, it has been found that private 
individuals have to work out the early stages of these 
inventions before Governments will look at them.” 











                                            
25 HL Deb 16 March 1909. 
From, “The Worlds Work”, May 1913, p.490. 
https://archive.org/stream/worldswork26gard#page/490/mode/2up 
Figure 2: Richard Haldane, Ist Viscount Haldane. 
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2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I examine the development of airships in Britain in the period 
between 1908 and 1914. I begin by focussing on the state of aviation in Britain in the 
early years of the 20th Century and examine the ways in which three key groups, 
politicians, the military and journalists reacted to and exploited the fears and 
promises generated by the rapid emergence of aviation in the early years of the 20th 
Century. I focus on three main topics: firstly, the state of aeronautics in Britain prior 
to the First World War paying particular attention to the different levels of interest 
displayed by the government, armed forces and the press. Secondly, I examine the 
“Phantom airship scare” of May 1909, which illustrated the fear held in certain parts 
of British society that Britain was falling behind continental powers such as France 
and Germany in the development of this new technology. Finally I investigate the 
development of the “naval airship” between 1909 and 1911 paying special attention 
to the interest shown by Members of Parliament and by the newspapers in the 
design and construction of this vessel and the different reactions to the wreck of the 
ship before its first test flight. 
 In this analysis I will be building on and critiquing Alfred Gollin’s, The impact of 
airpower on the British people and their Government, 1909-1426. Deborah Douglas’s 
1991 review in Technology and Culture identifies a series of five problems with 
Gollin’s text: two of which are relevant to this study.27 Douglas’s fourth criticism is 
                                            
26 Gollin 1989. 
27 Douglas’s remaining criticisms are that: Firstly, Gollin’s style requires the reader to have a firm grounding in British 
history and politics for the early 20th Century. Secondly the narrative is poorly organised and jumps backwards and 
forwards through time in a confusing manner. Thirdly, Gollin quotes an excessive number of primary sources in their 
entirety but makes little or no reference to secondary sources. 
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that although discussing the impact of air power on the government he ignores the 
British people therefore ignoring the influence of the general population on 
government decisions. Douglas’s final criticism is that Gollin treats aircraft as a 
merely being a catalyst used to spark debate and does not test his ideas against the 
capabilities of the technology at the time, seeming to treat it as inevitable that the 
aeroplane would become the dominant form of aerial travel when this was not 
obvious to those involved.28 I aim to build on this final criticism by demonstrating 
that prior to the First World War the airship was seen as both a plausible threat to 
the security of Britain and a possible solution to the needs of the British armed 
forces. No British firms seriously considered using the airship for commercial travel 
until the early 1920s. 
2.2 The State of Play 
By 1908 aviation had begun to take off throughout Europe and aviators in both 
France and Germany had made progress in improving the performance of the early 
flying machines often building on the early work of the Wright brothers. Many of 
these early achievements were initiated by private individuals but often supported 
by the state. In March 1909 Lord Montagu of Beaulieu, a conservative peer and an 
early advocate of aviation rose to speak in the House of Lords, challenging the 
Government over both the slow pace of development and the general lack of 
interest shown in aviation by the British Government and Military authorities in 
comparison to that demonstrated by the Governments of France and Germany. 
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Montagu outlined the developments that had taken place in aviation over the 
previous twenty years and stated that he believed the time had come for the 
government to take an active role in the development of aviation. He emphasized 
the distances flown by French and German airships, comparing this to the distance 
between points in Britain and on the continent, in an attempt to demonstrate 
Britain’s vulnerability to aerial attack. The government response, issued by Lord 
Crew, outlined a policy of making use of private enterprise in the development of 
aeronautical technology; however, it was admitted that this excluded airship 
experimentation which was the responsibility of the War Office and the Admiralty. 
Lord Crewe further stated that the policy of watching foreign developments in order 
to take advantage of others experience at little cost to the British government had 
been successful in the past particularly in the case of the submarine.29 
The unease felt by Lord Montagu was echoed in the popular press, in particularly in 
the Northcliffe owned Daily Mail and Times. Between 1906 and 1925, in an effort to 
promote aviation in Britain, Lord Northcliffe regularly offered prizes for 
achievements in aviation.30 The main source of this unease emanated from Germany, 
where Count Ferdinand Von Zeppelin, a retired cavalry officer with the Prussian 
army, had developed an interest in airships following his experience with 
observation balloons while serving as an observer with the Union Army during the 
American Civil War. Zeppelin began his work on airships partially in response to the 
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threat he felt from French developments during the 1880s.31 After almost a decade 
of fighting for funding for his designs Zeppelin finally succeeded in raising the money 
to build his first experimental airship which was finally launched in July 1901.  
 
Figure 3: Count Ferdinand Von Zeppelin. 
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Source : Current History of the War v.II (April 1915 - 
September 1915). New York: New York Times Company 
 
- 31 - 
On the 6 July 1908 an article was published in the Evening Telegraph comparing the 
new British non-rigid airship Nulli Secondus(figure.4)32 with Zeppelins LZ.4. (figure.5) 
The newspapers lauded the British achievement but lamented that it was the best 
Britain could hope to achieve given the lack of funding being made available by the 
War Office.33 A letter to The Times on 13 July 1908 began by pointing out the number 
of announcements in the press regarding aerial developments on the continent 
before going on to describe Britain as “only a third-class power as regards her 
equipment for aerial warfare.” The correspondent went on to describe the level of 
spending on aerial development in Britain and accused the Government of being 
unaware of the gravity of the situation. The letter concluded by pointing out that 
England’s secure position as an island was under threat from the air.34 Meanwhile on 
11 July 1908 the Daily Mail had published a report from their Berlin correspondent 
outlining an interview with Rudolf Martin, a German Privy Councillor, who suggested 
that in the event of war between Britain and Germany it would be possible for 
Germany to land 350,000 men in Dover using airships. All it would take would be an 
undisclosed sum of money and Germany would only need two years to construct the 
required airships.35 
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Figure 4: Nulli Secondus. Britain's First Airship. 
Picture by, Frederike J. van Uildriks. First published in "Omhoog in het luchtruim! Praatje over het luchtvaartvraagstuk "De 
Aarde en haar volken" Obtained from http://www.gutenberg.org/files/14178/14178-h/14178-h.htm 
 
Figure 5: LZ 4 über dem Bodensee, © Archiv der Luftschiffbau Zeppelin GmbH. 
 
Source: http://www.snipview.com/q/LZ%204 
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2.3 Government Plans 
Contrary to the concerns exhibited by elements of the press, neither the British 
government nor the military had been idle. In October 1908 a Sub-committee of the 
Committee of Imperial Defence on Aerial Navigation was formed under Lord Esher 
with instructions to investigate three aspects of aerial navigation. First to investigate 
the dangers posed to Britain, either on land or at sea by probable developments in 
aerial navigation. Secondly to consider the possible military or naval advantages that 
could be gained by developing aviation technologies. Finally to consider how much 
expenditure should be given over to aerial experiments and to which department/s it 
should be allotted.36 When, in January 1909, the sub-committee reported back, it 
concluded that developments in aviation had now reached a stage where it would be 
“improvident and possibly dangerous to assume that the rapid developments which 
the art of aerostatics has recently made may not entail in the near future risks by 
land and sea.” As a result the committee decided that in order to ascertain how 
serious a threat might be posed by developments in aerial navigation, it was first 
necessary to develop British airships, recommending that £35,000 should be added 
to the Naval Estimates to provide for the design and construction of a large rigid-
airship while a further £10,000 should be included in the Army Estimates in order to 
provide for continued experiments into non-rigid airships.37 
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On the 5 May 1909 the Liberal Prime Minister Asquith, announced in the House of 
Commons the appointment of a Special Committee for Aeronautics to place the 
development of aviation in Britain on a proper scientific basis.38 To that end the 
committee comprised ten members, seven of whom were Fellows of the Royal 
Society,39 with a representative from the Army and the Navy also included.  In 
preparation for this Haldane40, the Minister for War had written to Lord Northcliffe, 
in order to gain the support of his papers for this move. He had explained that the 
new department would be connected to the National Physical Laboratory and would 
be linked to the Army and Navy only through the Treasury. Both the Army and Navy 
were to have their own construction departments but would receive technical 
support and advice from the committee;41 a move which it was hoped would prevent 
the duplication of research by the two groups. 
This decision was well received by conservative papers such as the Daily Mail the 
Daily Telegraph and The Times, all of which responded positively to the 
establishment of aeronautics on a firm scientific basis. However, other papers such 
as the Daily News were less enthusiastic about the government’s approach. Alfred 
Gardiner, editor of the Daily News, was a supporter of the Liberal Government but 
was opposed to the militarization of the air. On 6 May Gardiner stated in a leader 
that, while he disliked the idea of developing airships for military purposes, the 
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Government had waited too long in allowing other nations to take the lead in 
aviation and that it was to be hoped that this new Government venture would be 
more successful than previous efforts. The ultra-conservative Morning Post took an 
even more extreme view. In what amounted to an outright attack on the 
government the lead article accused the government of having virtually ignored 
aviation up to the present. This article concluded by warning that the development 
of aviation would mean the end of Britain’s insular position, and that the “danger of 
attack from the air can only be prevented by the creation of a strong fleet of 
airships.” On the 7 May a further article in the Morning Post raised concerns that the 
Governments approach to aviation was overly theoretical; it included an interview 
with Lord Montagu in which he warned that, while the committee established by the 
government was strong in terms of theory, it did not appear to contain anyone with 
practical experience in aviation.42 
2.4 Airship Scares 
Around this time various newspapers began reporting sightings of mysterious 
airships in the skies over England, the majority of these reports being centred around 
the Eastern counties bordering on the North Sea (or as it was sometimes named, the 
German Sea). One such report in the Daily Mail was of a Peterborough Police 
Constable, who reported sighting an airship early in the evening on the 23 March 
1909, with corroboration by a fellow officer.43 Further sightings were reported across 
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East Anglia but, despite being investigated by the police and by the Daily Mail, they, 
were unable to be confirmed and several cases turned out to be hoaxes.44 
 This flurry of reports was quickly followed by a sighting in Cardiff on the 19 May, 
where several independent witnesses reported an airship flying over the city; a 
second report was made of a previous sighting some hours before in which a 
traveller reported seeing an airship on the ground with two foreign gentlemen 
studying a map who, on being approached returned to their ship and flew off 
towards Cardiff.45 This story was reported in an almost identical fashion in most of 
the major newspapers throughout the country and over the course of the next few 
days a number of possible explanations were suggested. Some papers seemed to 
support the idea that the airship in question was of foreign, probably German origin 
and was operating from a German ship cruising in the Bristol Channel.46 A further 
possible explanation was that the airships could be toys sold by Percival Spencer of 
C.G. Spencer and Sons Balloon Manufacturers. A noted aeronaut in his own right, 
Spencer suggested that the numerous airship sightings around Britain at the time 
could be accounted for if “some enterprising firm in search of a colossal 
advertisement has been purchasing large quantities of model airships.” He suggested 
that the lights reported on the sighted airships could be the spirit lamps used in 
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models to create lift.47 This was supported by a report in the Aberdeen Journal on 24 
May 1909, when a Mr. Thomas reported sighting a large airship bearing the name 
“BOVRIL” on the side: he estimated the ship to be about twenty five feet long which 
Spencer, had reported as being the average length of the unmanned airships sold by 
his firm.48 
Despite the more balanced approach taken by some parts of the British press (a 
factor largely ignored by Alfred Gollin) papers such as the Morning Post continued to 
raise fears of invasion or attack by foreign airships.49 However, the Daily Mail often 
offered a more nuanced approach to the airship scare and at least attempted to 
explain to its readership the difference between what was currently possible and the 
predictions being made about future developments. Lord Northcliffe was also 
alarmed by the impact of the “phantom airship scare” on German attitudes towards 
Britain. Writing from Berlin Lord Northcliffe cited three German newspapers. First 
the Berliner Neueste Nachrichten, which describe the “scare” as “the English 
melodrama” and stated that the scare itself was ridiculous and potentially dangerous 
to relations between Britain and Germany.  The second paper quoted by Northcliffe 
was the Hamburger Nachrichten; the writer reported suspicions that England was 
attempting to provoke Germany, although he was unsure as to what the ultimate 
purpose of this might be. Meanwhile the Berliner Taggblatt likened the relations 
between Britain and Germany to the piling up of explosives in a magazine, stating 
                                            
47 Western Times, 22 May 1909, p.4. 
48 Aberdeen Journal, 24 May 1909, p.5. 
49 Gollin 1989, p.57. 
- 38 - 
that it would only take a small spark to set it off. Northcliffe went on to suggest that 
rather than focusing on sensationalist stories regarding phantom airships, his readers 
would be better off considering the very real threat posed by the increases to the 
German Navy and the alliances being formed between Germany and the Austro-
Hungarian Empire.50 Shortly after Northcliffe’s article was published the panic 
surrounding the scare began to die down: however, it had already served to 
reinforce the fear that the slow paced theoretical approach favoured by Haldane 
would not enable Britain to successfully compete with aeronautical achievements on 
the continent. Letters from the British Naval Attaché in Berlin dated as early as 
November 1908 show an increasing degree of interest in investigating the utility of 
airships for naval purposes.51 It is interesting to note that at the time of the 
“phantom airship scare” the German navy had not yet expressed any official interest 
in obtaining Zeppelins for the Fleet, and that the Kaiser regarded the idea of a 
German invasion of England by airship to be laughable.52 However, none of this 
information was available to the general public and it is unclear how far it was 
disseminated throughout the British military. This episode serves to highlight the 
fears of the British population about Britain’s relatively backwards position in 
aviation matters and the importance of the press in either exacerbating or calming 
those fears.  
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2.5 The Press intervenes 
On 21 June 1909 an editorial in Morning Post declared that “with respect to British 
aeronautical achievement: ‘… so far as any useful effort goes absolutely nothing is 
being done, and nothing will be done.’”53  As a result on 22 June Arthur Du Cros, 
Secretary of the ”Parliamentary Aerial Defence Committee” announced that an 
arrangement had been concluded to attempt to fly a modern airship from Paris to 
London in order to undergo trials with the possibility of the craft later being 
purchased on behalf of the nation. The only obstacle to this was the need for a shed 
to house the airship during its time in Britain. Du Cros, appealed to the public for the 
£5,000 required for the construction of this building. This sum was immediately 
volunteered by the Daily Mail on the condition that the airships’ designer should 
remain in Britain for one month. This was reported in the Hastings and St Leonards 
Observer on 26 June. The paper included the text of the letter, dated 21 June, sent 
from Du Cros to Parliament in which he reveals that the committee had for some 
time been in communication with the Clement-Bayard company in France, arranging 
for trials to be carried out on a new airship with specifications comparable to the 
latest Zeppelin. The arrangement would include the option to buy the airship for the 
British military. The intention was to have the airship shed completed in time for the 
ship to be flown over in August,54 but due to unforeseen delays the ship did not 
arrive in England until 16 October 1910. On delivery it was discovered that the 
airship was in a poor state of repair; according to Gollin (1989) the War Office did not 
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wish to purchase the vessel for the asking price and a private subscription was 
required to make up the difference in cost. Once the airship was handed over to the 
War Office on 28 October 191055 it was discovered that the envelope56 leaked badly 
and it was uneconomical to keep the ship in use.  
 A similar attempt by the press to provide an airship for the Army took place at 
approximately the same time. In June 1909 the Morning Post launched a National 
Airship Fund aiming to purchase another French airship for the country. In this case a 
Lebaudy-type non-rigid airship was purchased and delivered on 26th October 1910. 
While the airship made it safely to Britain, the manufacturers had taken it upon 
themselves to increase the dimensions of the envelope without informing the 
Morning Post or the War Office of these changes, as a result the shed constructed 
was too small and the airship was damaged while being housed.57  Once the required 
repair work was completed in May 1911 the craft was taken up for a test flight. The 
ship crashed while attempting to land and was damaged beyond economical repair.58 
While these two incidents ended any direct attempts by the press to influence the 
development of airships in Britain they demonstrate the interest displayed by the 
conservative papers in promoting active experiments in airship development and the 
frustration felt by some at the slow pace of the official efforts.  However, by mid-
                                            
55 Aberdeen Journal, 29 October 1910, p.7. 
56 The outer covering of an airship encompassing the gas bags; on a non-rigid airship the shape of the envelope is 
maintained by the pressure of the lifting gas, whereas on a rigid airship the shape is maintained by the internal 
framework. 
57 Exeter and Plymouth Gazette, 27 October 1910, p.6. 
58 Lincolnshire Echo, 5 May 1911, p.3. 
- 41 - 
1911, after a great many delays and extra expense the experimental rigid airship 
being built for the Royal Navy by the Vickers Company was finally complete and 
almost ready for launch.  
2.6 His Majesties Airship.1 “Mayfly” 
from the George Grantham Bain Collection - Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division Washington, D.C. 20540 USA 
 
First conceived in 1909 by Captain Reginald Bacon, HMA.1 was widely and 
unofficially known as the “Mayfly”. The ship had been built to provide the Royal Navy 
with experience in the capabilities of rigid airships when working with the fleet. 
Designed in response to contemporary German Zeppelins, HMA.1  was intended to 
act as a reconnaissance unit for the fleet. The Admiralty specified that the ship 
should “have a speed of 40 knots over twenty-four hours; she was to be able to 
ascend to 1,500 feet: and she was to have a powerful (and therefore heavy) wireless 
Figure 6: HMA No.1 (Mayfly) in 1911 at her mooring. 
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apparatus, […].”59 As conceived the Mayfly was a highly advanced design, utilizing 
materials and technologies that would not be used by other nations until well into 
the First World War.  
As with other aviation-related issues the newspapers closely followed design and 
construction of “The Naval Airship”. On 13 March 1909 the Aberdeen Journal in 
reporting on the Naval estimates mentioned in passing that the Admiralty had 
decided that the navy should carry out further experiments with dirigibles and would 
construct an aerial vessel.60 However, papers such as The Hull Daily Mail while giving 
a little more detail about the construction plans and monies allocated, still suggested 
that aviation in general was not yet being taken seriously.61 Meanwhile, the Yorkshire 
Post reported that Mr Haldane had made a speech on Naval and Military 
aeronautics62 in which he had confirmed that Messrs Vickers at Barrow were in the 
process of constructing a large rigid airship for the Royal Navy. The ship was to be at 
least as large as current Zeppelin airships and the work, which was being carried out 
in great secrecy, should be completed by the spring of 1910.63 For the remainder of 
1909 little information was revealed about the airship, although by late December 
more information had become available detailing the rigorous testing taking place 
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for all the components of the design. The reports again mentioned the high level of 
secrecy surrounding the design and construction. One such report, published by the 
Evening Telegraph on 31 December 1909 detailed the process used to test the 
engines and propellers for the airship and pointed out that “no detail is allowed to 
enter into the design until it has stood all the tests ….”64 
In January 1910 the media interest in the Naval Airship continued with the Evening 
Telegraph writing about the impending appointment of an Inspecting Captain of 
Aeronautics to take command of the development of Britain’s Naval Airship. The 
article likened this to the similar appointment of Rear Admiral Bacon to the post of 
Inspecting Captain of Submarines in the early years of submarine development and 
expressed the hope that Britain would soon be as advanced in airships as it now was 
in submarines.65 On 31 January a further notice appeared in the Dundee Courier 
reporting that the Morning Post’s Barrow correspondent had discovered that the 
airship was not yet ready for launch and would not be for some months as the 
construction shed itself was not yet completed.66  
The delay in launching the ship did not go without comment in parliament and 
questions were asked as to the reason for the delay and the expected launch date 
and also requesting an update on the costs incurred so far in design and 
construction. On each occasion the First Lord of the Admiralty, McKenna responded 
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by saying that the ship was nearly ready and that there had been no delays that 
would not be expected in an experimental project.67 When the ship was finally 
launched on 22 May 1911 newspapers across the country reported on what was a 
major event in British aeronautics, promising to redress the perceived imbalance 
between Britain and Germany in aerial matters. The Evening Telegraph reported the 
event, beginning with an account of the launch procedure itself before moving on to 
a more detailed description of the airship.68 It should be noted that the report in the 
following days paper was more circumspect, stating that experts were concerned 
about the elaborate structure of the ship and suggesting that the money would have 
been better spend producing aeroplanes. The article ended with the hope that the 
ship would fulfil the expectations of her designers but commented that the name 
Mayfly was “not too convincing.”69 In contrast to this the report in the Daily Mail 
focused on the technicalities of the airships construction and equipment; 
commenting on the size of the ship describing it as an “improved rigid (or Zeppelin) 
type.”70 A separate article in the same paper revealed more details of the launch 
before again delving into a detailed description of the ships features.71 A further 
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report in The Times went into some detail about the trimming and stability tests to 
which the ship would be subjected to over the coming weeks.72  
In the course of carrying out those tests the “Mayfly” remained moored outside in 
the dock for ten days, during which time the ship withstood strong winds while 
remaining safely moored. A report in The Daily Mail noted that the ship had 
withstood winds of up to forty-five mph, commenting that no other airship had 
succeeded in remaining moored without shelter for that period of time. The report 
also noted that the ship was due to be returned to the shed in order to make some 
minor adjustments.73 These adjustments turned out to be more involved than either 
the press or Parliament had been led to believe. Questions were asked in the House 
of Commons on both the 4 and 5 July about the reason for returning the airship to its 
shed and how long it would before any trial flights took place. In both cases the First 
Lord was unable to give a date.74 No further questions were officially raised in 
Parliament about the Naval Airship until October 1911.  
On 2 June of that year the Daily Mail had published an article defending the new 
airship, stating that, contrary to the opinion of those who considered the ship a 
failure, it could already be considered a great success. According to the Daily Mail by 
simply remaining moored in the open for an extended period of time, the airship had 
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demonstrated its superiority over previous British airships such as the Nulli Secondus 
(Army Airship Number 1)75 as well as over the contemporary German Zeppelins. The 
editorial suggested that this achievement was vital in allowing for the future use of 
the airship for both civil and military functions and emphasised the fact that the 
airship was an experimental craft and that problems and delays were to be 
expected.76  
This was the last mention of the naval airship in the newspapers for almost two 
months. On 24 July the Sheffield Daily Telegraph reported that the Naval Airship was 
due to make a reappearance having had some structural alterations made following 
the tests in May. The report detailed the changes that had been made to strengthen 
the ships frames, as well as to the mooring arrangements.77 The source of this 
information is unclear, as the primary historical narratives make no mention of any 
work being done during this period to strengthen the ship. Some commentators 
appeared sceptical of the airship and on 29 July the Evening Telegraph published an 
article entitled “Is Naval Airship a White Elephant?” pointing out that many people 
were of the opinion that the ship would never be a success; however, the paper was 
quick to note that this viewpoint was not shared by the naval officers responsible or 
by Vickers Limited.78 
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By the end of August the Airship, still the centre of a great deal of public interest had 
not yet left the Vickers construction shed. Reports at the time offered a range of 
conflicting explanations for this though mainly focussed on issues of trim and 
stability. On 18 August the Daily Mail had reported that a crowd of thousands had 
been disappointed when the anticipated launch was again delayed due to doubts 
about the vessels buoyancy.79 A report in The Times on 10 August explained that, in 
an attempt to increase the available lift an external gangway had been removed and 
the gondoliers altered.80 Prior to this there had been no indication that the airship 
was too heavy. However, by mid-August the press revealed that the trials had been 
suspended due to issues with the lift, which still did not meet the specifications laid 
down by the Admiralty. On 23 August The Times reported that  a conference was to 
take place between the Admiralty and Barrow as to the best way to proceed, the 
options being either to add an extra bay and increase the lift or for the Admiralty to 
accept the ship despite it being overweight.81 It seems that a decision was made 
quite quickly as on the 29 August the Daily Mail reported that Vickers were 
attempting to lighten the airship so as to meet the contract specifications.82 
Meanwhile, the Aberdeen Journal suggested that the design of the airship may have 
been faulty.83 On 2 September the Journal issued another article claiming that the 
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airship had proved to be an official “white Elephant” and that either as a result of 
miscalculation or due to poor design, the ship was too heavy to fly, suggesting that 
this had been the reason for the lack of official information being released about the 
progress of the airship.84 
The Accident  
 
By mid-September the problems appeared to have been addressed and the ship was 
being readied for re-launching by its naval crew. Both the Times and the Daily Mail 
reported on a new method of inflating the gasbags that it was hoped would 
eliminate some of the issues of gas purity which had caused stability problems on 
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Figure 7: The Naval Airship HMA No.1 "Mayfly" with her back broken. 
Imperial War Museum Photo Q 112311 
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earlier trials.85 The Mayfly made its second and final appearance on 24 September. 
While being withdrawn from the shed the airship was caught by a gust of wind 
causing it to roll over onto its beam. After righting the ship, the crew attempted to 
manoeuvre its bow round into the wind, at which point the ship broke in two leaving 
the crew to jump over-board in order to avoid being caught under the hull as it 
collapsed.  This was reported in the Times on 25 September and readers were 
reminded that on 26 August the paper had suggested that the airship would not be 
able to carry its contract weight.86 On the same day the Daily Mail released a more 
detailed version of events as witnessed by their Barrow correspondent. He 
speculated that the collapse might have been caused by one of the gasbags bursting, 
placing additional strain upon the structure, before commenting on the efficiency of 
the naval crew in returning the wrecked airship to its shed. He went on to report that 
the officers concerned did not appear to be discouraged by the incident but 
expected repair work to begin almost immediately.87  
On 28 September the Daily Mail published a letter to the Editor from someone 
signing themselves as Per Mare Per Aera.88 This individual was concerned that 
members of the press would magnify the Mayfly accident “beyond its true 
proportions” and use it as an excuse to glorify the aeroplane over the airship, 
suggesting that any tendency to do so may be due to the numbers of people who 
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had invested in aeroplanes compared to those investing in airships. The author 
pointed out that both the airship and the aeroplane would have a role to play in 
naval strategy. He went on to point out that it had taken Germany “many 
disheartening failures and much money expended” before they had a ship that could 
be considered successful. He highlighted the valuable data and experience gained in 
constructing the Mayfly and warned that to abandon this would risk losing 
supremacy in the air which he believed would be as vital to Britain’s safety as the 
ships of the Royal Navy.89 This proved to be a salient concern when on 26 October a 
question was asked in the House of Commons about possible plans for the 
development of naval aeroplanes due to the failure of the airship.90  
Both the Dundee Courier and the Aberdeen Journal printed articles on 25 September 
describing the incident and discussing the probable causes. One thing that both 
agreed on was that over the previous few weeks many articles and statements had 
appeared in the papers discussing the lightening of the ship, which they believed to 
be in error. Both papers argued that any changes made to the airship’s structure had 
been intended to improve the strength and rigidity of the hull rather than to lighten 
it in any way. Indeed it would appear that the airships buoyancy had never caused 
any apprehension in either the builders or government.91 This contrasts with the 
official histories of the Mayfly which state that one of the causes of the accident was 
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the removal of the external keel; this action which had been opposed by a member 
of the Vickers design team, H. B. Pratt. Who, had warned that doing so would 
compromise the strength of the hull.92 Not all the papers were so sympathetic in 
their reporting of the incident. On 26 September the Sheffield Daily Telegraph called 
for a searching enquiry into the disaster and stated that “ever since its inception the 
Admiralty has been strongly criticised for its adoption of a type of craft that has long 
since been shown … to be a hopeless failure.” The report went on to point out that 
with only a single exception every rigid airship produced thus far had been destroyed 
in some form of accident, and questioned the lack of experiment undertaken before 
building such a large and costly vessel.93 
The Enquiry  
An enquiry into the Mayfly disaster had already been ordered by the Admiralty. No 
work was to be carried out on the airship until aeronautical experts94 had examined 
it and the court of enquiry had reached a decision as to the cause of the incident.  It 
has been impossible to find the precise date of the court of enquiry and the records, 
which were never released to the public, no longer exist. However, the court did 
exonerate the officers and crew from any blame in the accident.95 When the matter 
was raised in Parliament Winston Churchill, now the First Lord of the Admiralty, 
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stated that the Navy did not intend to make the enquiry public and that the future 
development of naval airships was still under consideration at the Admiralty.96 
The decision taken by the Admiralty was based on the recommendation of the 
Technical Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence dated 28 February 
1912. The sub-committee was of the opinion that the prospects of successfully 
employing large rigid airships were not yet sufficiently favourable to justify the high 
costs expended and recommended that for the present naval experiments should be 
limited to developing aeroplanes and hydro-aeroplanes. They also suggested that a 
watch should be kept on foreign developments and the question re-examined if any 
new developments appeared to make it desirable.97 This decision temporarily put an 
end to the Royal Navy’s interest in the rigid airship. As had been noted by the 
Sheffield Daily Telegraph, the Mayfly had met with a large number of accidents and 
disasters during its construction. However, as others such as the mysterious Per 
Mare Per Aera, noted the rigid airship still promised to fulfil a role at sea, for which 
the aeroplane was unsuitable. 
The Admiralty decision to halt research can be at least partially explained by the 
reports being received from the British Naval Attaché in Berlin throughout the 
1910/1911 period. These appeared to suggest a diminishing level of interest in the 
airship in favour of the aeroplane, due to the number of airship crashes during 
1910/1911 as well as the success of French aeroplanes during this period. 
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Unfortunately very few of the pertinent reports have survived due to the highly 
selective record keeping process of the Naval Intelligence Department98. One 
surviving report dated 9 December 1911 stated that “before the last few months the 
opinion largely held in Germany was that airships were useless and that aeroplanes 
would soon supplant them. This opinion we were voicing in our Report of October 
6th.”99  (Original Italics) 
2.7 Renewed Interest 
Nevertheless subsequent reports seem to confirm a renewed German interest in the 
airship as a vehicle of war. While many historians such as Douglas Robinson have 
focussed on the rigid Zeppelin-type airships, Germany also invested a considerable 
amount in the non-rigid ships such as the Parsavel type. A further report from the 
Berlin Naval attaché on 11 December suggested that while aeroplane development 
in Germany lagged behind that of Britain and France he believed that Germany had 
overcome many of the difficulties associated with operating rigid airships.100 While a 
communication in January 1912 reported on a conversation with a serving German 
Naval Officer who expressed an opinion that the German authorities were 
considering the possibilities of using airships offensively against British ships, towns 
and dockyards, it was recommended that representatives from both the army and 
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navy should be sent to investigate the situation in Germany.101 Finally on 29 March 
1912 the naval attaché reported on the purchase of a Zeppelin-type airship for the 
German Navy with the probability of more being ordered in the near future.102 
Shortly after this, in April 1912, Winston Churchill reported to the Cabinet that 
airship development in Germany had made such great strides and that as the 
aeroplane still did not possess sufficient range or endurance for naval 
reconnaissance, investigations into airships should be resumed.103 
Following the recommendation from the naval attaché in Berlin Captain Murray 
Sueter104 and Mr O’Gormon105 were sent to Germany in order to study foreign 
airship development. Their report submitted to the Technical Sub-Committee of the 
C.I.D in July 1912 showed that airship development in Germany had reached a point 
at which patrols by airship would be able to prevent the British Fleet from 
approaching the German coastline unobserved, rendering the Admiralty policy of 
close blockade useless. It also indicated that Germany had made progress in 
refuelling airships at sea while on patrol as well as in the dropping of ordinance from 
an airship.  As a result of this report it was decided to attempt to purchase non-rigid 
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airships from both Germany and France in order to gain experience in the handling of 
larger airships.106 
On 7 October The Times reported that the Zeppelin constructed for the German 
Navy, had been inspected by the Naval Commission who had witnessed its trials. The 
paper then gave a remarkably detailed description of the ship, which was interesting 
for this Zeppelin’s similarities to the failed British HMA No1 in terms of size and 
layout.107  At the same time the British Naval attaché in Germany reported on the 
arrival of this airship in Berlin after a 30-hour flight from Friedrichschafen. He 
reported that the craft had carried 21 passengers and that the original intention had 
been to remain airborne for 48 hours but due to extra personnel being carried to test 
the wireless system this had been reduced.108 This event was also reported in The 
Times on 15 October, thus, demonstrating how closely foreign aeronautical 
developments were being followed by the British press.109 
2.8 Last Minute Developments 
On the night of 14 October 1912 an incident occurred, the reporting of which re-
awakened fears of the possibility of attack by German airships. At about 7.30 p.m. an 
unknown airship was heard passing over Sheerness. No newspaper report was made 
of this incident at the time and it was not mentioned in Parliament until November 
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that year. However, when the incident was questioned in parliament, Churchill was 
unable to state whether the craft was an aeroplane or airship, but did state that 
flares had been lit at a nearby air station in case it was a foreign vessel requiring 
assistance.110 On 18 November an article in The Times suggested that the only airship 
which could have been over Sheerness on the 14 October was the German Naval 
airship L.1.111 On 25 November the British Naval attaché submitted a report stating 
that he did not believe it was possible for the craft reported over Sheerness to be the 
German Naval L.1; he had also investigated all the German airships capable of 
making such a flight and had accounted for their movements on the night in 
question.112 This information was not made available to the press. The identity of 
this airship remained unknown and as far as I have been able to ascertain has never 
been established, although suggestions that the L.1 made a detour en-route to Berlin 
were published in the Manchester Courier in February 1913.113 This incident was to 
be of great value to Winston Churchill and Admiral Jellico in their efforts to re-start 
the production of rigid airships in Britain. An Admiralty report on ‘Aerial Navigation’ 
dated June 1913, noted that the Admiralty had entered into negotiations with 
Vickers Limited for the construction of five airships, four of the Parseval non-rigid 
type to be built under licence from Germany and one large Zeppelin type airship. 
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This was partly in response to the decision by the German Navy to build a fleet of ten 
Zeppelin type airships and fifty hydro-aeroplanes.114  By December 1912 the 
potential utility of the airship for naval duties had become obvious to most parties. It 
was revealed that the Royal Navy had placed orders with the Astra Company in 
France and the Parsavel Company in Germany for airships, as well as for some fixed 
wing aeroplanes from France. This was quickly reported in the British press with the 
Evening Telegraph reporting on the 5 December stating that a large ship had been 
ordered from the Astra Company and was now nearing completion, having been laid 
down115 in August.116 On 12 December the Aberdeen Journal reported that the 
Admiralty had ordered a Parsavel type airship from Germany which should be ready 
for acceptance trials sometime in the spring.117  
2.9 The 1913 Scare 
The early part of 1913 was to witness yet another “phantom airship” scare with 
reports of airship sightings throughout England and Scotland. Many of these reports 
included no details as to the type of airship sighted but merely reported hearing aero 
engines and sighting moving lights in the sky.  A report in the Daily Mail on 26 
February mentions a supposed sighting over Hull although the Daily Mail 
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correspondent was convinced that this was a star.118 As with the previous scare in 
1909 the German reaction was scathing. On 27/28 February The Times reported that 
according to official German sources, it was impossible that any of the supposed 
sightings could be a German airship as any flight of this nature would have entailed a 
daylight departure and over flight of Belgium which would surely be noticed and 
reported. Further to this it was reported that the German press viewed the latest 
“scare” as an example of Britain being in a “perpetual state of nervousness or 
panic.”119 
2.10 Conclusion 
By the time war broke out on 4 August 1914, the Royal Navy had made great strides 
in the development of both rigid and non-rigid airships. Having taken over the army 
airships in April 1913 the Royal Navy had a total of six non-rigid airships available, 
including the German-built Parseval and the French-built Astra Torres. Only one rigid 
airship was in the process of construction at Barrow by Vickers Limited. Throughout 
this period the Admiralty had been unable to commit to a definite program of airship 
development and while acknowledging an interest in using airships for scouting 
purposes they were unable to agree as to the best type to develop, either rigid or 
non-rigid and were not willing to spend huge sums of money on a technology which 
as yet did not appear to have the potential to significantly affect the outcome of a 
battle. In this the development was very similar to that of Submarines and was 
                                            
118 Daily Mail, 26 Feb. 1913, p.5. 
119 The Times, 27 Feb. 1913, p.6. 
- 59 - 
primarily driven by a small dedicated core of officers; in many cases the same ones 
who had been involved in the early submarine experiments. Development was 
further hindered by the political upheavals taking place in the Admiralty; between 
1908 and 1914 the Royal Navy had undergone four changes of First Sea Lord, while 
the First Lord of the Admiralty had changed three times. Each new appointment 
brought about changes in the priorities and strategy of the Navy with new 
development often appearing to by spurred by developments abroad. This had been 
picked up by the press who, by highlighting the advances made in foreign aviation 
when compared to those made in Britain, stirred fears of invasion and national 
vulnerability in order to provoke the government and armed forces to invest in 
aviation.  
The attempt by Haldane to secure Northcliffe’s support for the government’s plans in 
1908 suggests that at least some politicians believed that the support of the press 
could be a powerful tool in shaping and steering public opinion. However, without 
any firm evidence it is difficult to substantiate this claim. 
The “phantom airship” scares of 1909 and later 1913 also played a significant role in 
shaping British attitudes towards the airship. Whether or not the sightings were real, 
the mere fact that Germany and France possessed airships capable of such a flight 
and that the British government could do nothing to prevent it turned it into a 
powerful tool for those who felt that aviation of all types had been neglected by the 
Government. When the invasion fears failed to provoke increased spending the 
Conservative press led by the Daily Mail and Morning Post attempted to directly 
intervene in the procurement of airships while these attempts failed to produce any 
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worthwhile results they demonstrated the interest of the papers proprietors in the 
development of aviation. 
By 1914 the airship already had something of a mixed reception throughout all levels 
of British society. Seen by some as a vehicle offering great potential for the defence 
of the country and as a means of increasing the reach of the Royal Navy, for others 
the airship was a potent threat demonstrating Britain’s decline in relation to the 
continental powers. Due to the slow pace of British development and the setbacks 
caused by the loss of the Mayfly, Britain had been unable to assess the effectiveness 
of the airship for either military or civil use and had not had any opportunity to test 
or practice defensive measures. The First World War would provide the first 
opportunity for the hopes and fears of the British press, politicians and military to be 
put to the test. 
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Chapter 3 





“Friday January 1st 1915: London: I was suddenly seized 
with a creepy dread of Zeppelins, against which the 
London population had been warned” 
Vera Brittain, War Diary 1913-1917: Chronicle of Youth.120  
 
 
“Why newspapers are prohibited from publishing details 
of Zeppelin raids” 
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3.1 Introduction 
While aviation technologies such as the static observation balloon had been used by 
British Military forces in previous conflicts, the First World War was the first in which 
the dirigible balloon or airship played a major role. However, when war broke out 
British forces were not expecting that airships would be a major feature of combat. 
In August 1914 Britain had just six non-rigid airships available with a single rigid 
“Zeppelin” type airship under construction. Two of the available ships had been 
purchased abroad in 1913 including one Parsavel-type airship which had been 
brought from Germany. On the outbreak of the war these airships began patrolling 
the English Channel in an attempt to protect the ship-bound British Expeditionary 
Force from attack by German submarines; they were also used to scout for the 
German army’s advance in Belgium but were soon withdrawn to Britain as their 
vulnerability to rifle fire became clear to the naval authorities. This scale of activity 
can be contrasted with a reported eighteen German airships which had the capability 
to reach Britain from bases in Germany.122 However, due to the secrecy imposed by 
Admiralty, the British public were largely unaware of the existence of the British 
airships used in supportive missions and more generally the work which was 
undertaken using them during the war. They were instead, reliant on the 
newspapers for information. However, given the censorship activities, the editorial 
staff of the Newspapers focused only on the German Zeppelins, reporting both their 
attacks on Britain and their destruction at the hands of Britain’s aerial defences. No 
historian has previously asked to what extent this negative publicity of the German 
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Zeppelins, and the absence of positive reports on the work of British airships, 
influenced British perceptions of the airship. 
In this chapter I examine the effects of press reporting of the airship during the First 
World War on British perceptions of the airship. I build primarily on the work of Barry 
D. Powers123  and Thomas Fegan.124 While Powers cited the Zeppelin and Gotha 
attacks to illustrate how the RAF and its policy of strategic bombing came into being, 
he ignored the importance to the development of the post-war aircraft industry in 
Britain of those Zeppelin and Gotha raids and the ways in which they were reported, 
particularly by the Northcliffe press. Similarly, while Fegan has provided detailed 
information on the major Zeppelin and Gotha raids he did not consider the extent 
which these affected the subsequent development of airpower in Britain. In what 
follows I show that these events and the ways in which they were reported 
significantly influenced the post-war fate of the airship in Britain.  
I begin by examining the ways in which press reports contributed to creating a high 
level of fear concerning the Zeppelin attacks, possibly as a means of diverting public 
attention from the events on the Western Front and the Dardanelles. Ariela 
Freedman describes the Zeppelin threat as being more imaginary than real, yet 
Zeppelins became the “defining markers of the home-front wartime sky.”125  While it 
is incontrovertible that people died during the raids, the vast majority of the British 
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civilian population did not have first-hand experience of a raid, instead relying on 
newspaper reports and rumour. This is demonstrated by the level of importance 
attached to the Zeppelin raids by the newspaper proprietors compared to other 
events in the war. An article appearing in the April 1916 edition of W.T. Stead’s 
Review of Reviews argued that the threat posed by the Zeppelins was being blown 
out of proportion. This was at least in part because the public could relate to the 
Zeppelin attacks in a way which they could not relate to events on the Western 
Front.126  In fact, little has been written by historians about the impact on individuals 
of seeing Zeppelins destroyed during the Great War, beyond noting the 
contemporary descriptions of the destruction and celebrations by the British citizens 
on the ground. I therefore show that witnessing the violent end of the German 
Zeppelins created an additional if unconscious level of fear in the minds of the British 
civilians and military forces regarding the safety of airships compared to aeroplanes. 
This was again re-enforced by the lack of information in the press on British airship 
activities during the war, in particular the low casualty rates suffered by the 
defensive use of the British airship Service which due to press censorship were not 
publicly reported until after the war in 1919.  
Finally I examine the effects of the Gotha bomber aeroplane raids on Britain which 
occurred from May 1917 until late 1918, to demonstrate that the high levels of 
destruction caused during these raids in comparison to the earlier Zeppelin raids 
served to strengthen the perception, created by the press, that the aeroplane was a 
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more powerful and reliable means of flight. I argue that this influenced the post-war 
Royal Air Force to develop the heavy bomber instead of the airship as the RAF 
viewed the aeroplane as having greater utility as a strategic bomber; this in turn 
provided a stronger argument to retain the RAF as an independent force after the 
war. 
Due to the number127 of German air raids on Britain during the First World War, it is 
neither feasible nor appropriate to discuss the impact of each and every individual 
raid.128 Instead I focus only on those raids which can be considered noteworthy 
either due to the significant way in which the press reported them, or because of the 
conspicuous success or failure of Britain’s aerial defences in dealing with the raid as 
was implicitly reported in the newspapers which, due to censorship, were rarely able 
to publish complete details of air raids. 
3.2 Censorship: The Guiding Hand of Government 
One of the defining features of the First World War was the unprecedented level of 
censorship operated by the British State. Although censorship had theoretically been 
applicable in previous conflicts such as the Boer War, it had not always been 
rigorously enforced; indeed the high level of censorship in the First World War can 
be at least partly explained by the lack of trust engendered in senior military officers 
by the behaviour of journalists, such as Winston Churchill, during previous conflicts. 
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As Deian Hopkin pointed out this topic is difficult to research due in part to the sheer 
volume of source material available, with many newspapers producing daily editions 
making it extremely laborious to examine even a single week’s worth of reports to 
check for evidence of censorship. More importantly Hopkin pointed the historical 
researcher to the strategic study of two main threats to the State posed by the press 
during wartime. The first of these was the possibility of publishing information which 
might have been of military value to the enemy. The second concern was that the 
press might publish information damaging to the government’s mandate and its 
ability to prosecute the war, irrespective of its effect on the enemy.129  
On the outbreak of war in August 1914 the government created an official Press 
Bureau charged with controlling the supply of information from the frontlines to the 
papers and also with monitoring any telegrams and cables sent or received from the 
papers. The Press Bureau was “a delegate exercising the powers which ordinarily 
belonged to other government departments” in this case from the Admiralty and 
War Office. Tania Rose stated that all government departments were asked to use 
the Bureau in order to disseminate information to the press.130 In order to set 
boundaries on what could be published the Press Bureau issued directives known as 
“D” notices131 with instructions as to how certain news items should be treated. In 
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relation to this the Defence of the Realm Act (DORA),132 which came into force on 7 
August 1914, gave the government a broad range of powers to deal with any 
publications which breached these censorship rules. One clause referred to the need 
to “prevent the spread of false reports or reports likely to cause disaffection to His 
Majesty or to interfere with the success of His Majesty’s forces by land or sea or to 
prejudice His Majesty’s relations with foreign powers.”133 Given the success of the 
Northcliffe press in highlighting and reporting on the Shell Crisis in 1915 and the pre-
war interest in aviation demonstrated in his newspapers, described in the previous 
chapter it remains to be adequately explained why no concerted attempt had been 
made to address the state of Britain’s aerial defences during the early years of the 
war. This stands in stark contrast to the fears raised by the press and described in the 
previous chapter. These fears were also reflected in the questions asked by MPs in 
Parliament and by letters and editorials in the newspapers about the state of 
aviation in Britain and the possibility of aerial bombardment or invasion raised 
during the phantom airship scares of 1909 and 1913. One hypothesis I explore in this 
chapter is that Northcliffe had political backing from senior military commanders and 
politicians to expose the weaknesses of British munitions production, allowing his 
papers to circumvent the censor. By contrast I show that the Northcliffe press did not 
have such backing when it came to reporting on Britain’s aerial defences during the 
Zeppelin and Gotha raids of the First World War.  
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3.3 Warned but Unprepared: First Strike 
The first aerial attack on British soil was carried out at Dover on 24 December 1914 
by a German seaplane dropping a single bomb; it was reported in the Dover Express 
the following day indicating that a number of windows had been broken and a man 
was blown out of a tree (but otherwise uninjured). An article on the same page 
advised readers on the precautions to take in the event of aerial bombardment; this 
amounted to instructions to remain indoors and not to congregate on the streets to 
watch the raid.134 This December raid on Dover along with a further single aircraft 
raid up the Thames was reported in The Times on 26 December. The Times report 
offered its readers description of this raid including the route taken by the attacking 
aircraft and the approximate locations of the anti-aircraft batteries which engaged 
the craft forcing it to return to German held territory.135   
In January 1915 the First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill, presented a 
report to the War Council on the likelihood of Germany attempting to attack London 
using airships, declaring that there was “no known means of preventing the airships 
coming, and not much chance of punishing them on their return.” The report made it 
clear that the Admiralty was, at that stage powerless to prevent any attack by 
Zeppelins.136 Indeed when the first Zeppelin raid on Britain occurred on the night of 
19/20 January 1915, with bombs being dropped on King’s Lynn and Yarmouth on the 
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Norfolk coastline, there was no defensive response. Given the historic significance of 
this raid, it was reported in great detail in both local and national newspapers. The 
Times followed the story closely reporting in detail on the track of the attacking 
airships and locations on which bombs had been dropped.137 On 21 January The 
Times suggested that the Germans hoped to provoke terror in the British population, 
but had failed in this respect as the raid was met “with interest, but with absolute 
calmness”; its reporter enjoined its readers to a stoic response.138 When reporting on 
the damage done to Yarmouth the writer claimed the attack was less effective than 
the coastal bombardments carried out at Hartlepool and Scarborough in December 
1914.139 The final report in The Times on the Norfolk raid came on 23 January, with 
one article detailing changes to street lighting regulations in Yarmouth, reducing the 
level of lighting140 and a further article noted that appeals had been made to 
Parliament for aeroplanes and high angle guns to protect against further Zeppelin 
raids.141 It is unclear if any response was received to this. Although given the 
situation facing Britain at the time it is somewhat doubtful. 
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The intensity of the reporting on the Norfolk air raids provides an insight into the 
degree of importance attached to them by the press. This contrasts with the 
apparent lack of interest displayed in Parliament where discussions of air raids were 
limited to the topic of whether or not German spies had used car headlamps to guide 
the Zeppelins to their targets.142 The topics under Parliamentary discussion indicate 
that at this point the threat from aerial attack was, at least from the government’s 
point of view, considered to be inconsequential. The reports in The Times appear to 
indicate that the bombs had little impact on the populations of the targeted towns. 
Thomas Fegan notes that although the national papers had denounced the raid as 
being murderous and cowardly, many people in Norfolk were more upset by the 
damage caused and the lack of any warning issued prior to the attack.143 It is unclear 
precisely what form citizens expected this warning to have taken; indeed the debate 
over whether or not to provide air raid warnings to the general population was to 
continue in both Houses of Parliament and the newspapers for much of the war. 
Following the Norfolk raid no further Zeppelin attacks on Britain occurred until 14 
April when the German airship L.9144 made an opportunistic raid on the Tyne area.145  
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The next significant raid occurred on 31 May 1915 when a single Zeppelin146 
managed to bomb London.  On 1 June The Times published a brief account of the 
raid which merely reported that a raid had taken place causing a number of fires 
which according to the official Admiralty communiqué could not be “absolutely 
connected” with the airships presence. This article reported a communiqué from the 
Admiralty forbidding the press from publishing any information pertaining to aerial 
attacks on London: “the Admiralty communiqué is all the news which can properly 
be published.”147  The Daily Mirror gave a very similar report which also mentioned 
these Admiralty restrictions concerning reporting on air raids.148 The Times 
nevertheless published further details of the raid on 2 June, including an initial count 
of the casualties sustained. Yet the paper supported the Admiralty’s decision to 
restrict publicising information on air raids and instead only reported that “bombs 
fell in various localities not far distant from each other.”149 Elsewhere in the same 
edition a Times journalist attempted to draw lessons from the Zeppelin attack, 
suggesting that it was pointless boasting about the calmness exhibited by the 
population during the attack and stated that ‘sneers’ about the amount of damage 
caused by bombs were also pointless as they did not account for the probability that 
the raids carried out were merely experimental in nature. The Times went on to 
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suggest that people were ‘not willing to face up to the reality of the situation.’150  
Although it is unclear precisely who these ‘people’ are, it probably referred to 
members of the government. It may thus be taken as an early indication of the 
dissatisfaction of the Northcliffe press with the state of Britain’s aerial defences, a 
concern which was to be expressed regularly in his newspapers over the following 
year.  
The next air raid to occur was on 6/7 June 1915 and this caused severe damage and 
casualties in Hull. The report of the Hull attack in The Times was limited to the official 
Admiralty announcement which simply stated that “bombs were dropped on various 
places, but little damage was done.”151The raid was carried out by four zeppelins, 
two of which were forced to turn back from the British coast due to heavy fog. One 
of these was the LZ.37 which, at one o’clock in the morning, was sighted over Ostend 
by Flight Sub-Lieutenant Warneford.152 The Hull Daily Mail reported that Sub-
Lieutenant Warneford153 had been able to ascend above the Zeppelin and drop six 
bombs at least one of which hit the target. The writer suggested that the 
engagement had proven that the aeroplane is superior to the more expensive 
airship.154  This event was also reported in The Times, which published the 
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Admiralties official report of the night’s events along with corroboration from a 
source in Belgium.155 Warneford was awarded the Victoria Cross156 for this 
achievement which was announced in The Times on 9 June.157 His official report of 
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Figure 9: Portrait of Flight Sub-Lieutenant R.A.J. Warneford VC. 
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the encounter provides more precise detail on the timing and altitude of the attack 
but in all other regards is similar to the reports in newspapers.158 
Warneford’s success in destroying the Zeppelin eclipsed the attack on Hull which had 
been carried out the same night by the German navy’s Zeppelin L.9.159 The Hull Daily 
Mail report for 7 June carried the headline “why newspapers are prohibited from 
publishing details of Zeppelin raids.”160 This was followed up on page three by an 
article explaining that the paper was in support of this censorship due to the 
possibility of published information on the raids being of use to German airship 
commanders in establishing the accuracy of their navigation over Britain. The only 
aspect of the censorship to be criticised was the lack of information provided on the 
casualties caused as doing so would possibly help stop the spread of rumours.161 The 
Hull Daily Mail did not publish a direct criticism on the British air defences and 
indeed on 9 June the paper pointed out that in spite of the number of letters 
received on the topic of air raids it was unable to discuss the issue.162 However, 
following the raid a series of letters and articles were published which provide some 
indication as to the feelings stirred up by the raid among its readers and the 
publication of these letters indicates the importance attached to the topic by the 
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editorial staff. In one example on 9 June a reader made the suggestion that “A 
committee of gentlemen should be got together … to form a corps of aviators and 
provide air machines … for the protection of the city.”163 This topic remained in 
evidence for several issues with many correspondents writing in to offer their 
services.164  
The first complete record of the casualties for this raid finally appeared in The Times 
on 17 June as part of a report on a further attack on the north east coast on 16 
June.165 Morris noted that this attack on Tyneside was conspicuous due to the 
“accurate bomb practice on military objectives”166 which went unreported by the 
British press. However, there is some evidence of papers attempting to circumvent 
the censor’s guidelines. On 17 June the Newcastle Journal reported on the “Local Air 
Raid”; with the exception of the title, the article was restricted to the information 
available from the Press Bureau.167  
In early September the German Zeppelins carried out almost nightly raids on the east 
coast of England. On 8/9 September 1915, the Daily Mirror reported that airships 
had raided the metropolitan district, but did not give any more detailed descriptions 
as to the areas bombed. The paper also reported on the casualties from a raid on 7 
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September, emphasising the deaths of women and children, before quoting from 
Arthur Balfour168 who had previously described the Zeppelin raids as being brutal but 
ineffective. The paper noted that although both local anti-aircraft guns and 
aeroplanes had been active the Zeppelins had not been sighted by them.169  
The defence of the capital city against aerial attack was a matter of the gravest 
concern. The ability of the Zeppelins to breach London’s defences and escape 
unharmed caused a great deal of worry to the military  authorities and government. 
On 14 September, in a House of Commons debate on London’s anti-aircraft 
defences, McNamara170 announced the appointment of Admiral Sir Percy Scott171 to 
command London’s gunnery defences.  
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During this debate the question of which department was responsible for London’s 
defences was raised but left unsettled.172 Scott’s reputation as a gunnery specialist 
was widely known and reported in the press173 and may indicate that the Navy was 
still unconvinced about the ability of the aeroplane to destroy German airships. 
However, Morris states that one of Scott’s first requests was for a “fleet of at least a 
hundred aeroplanes armed with guns … and pilots to fly them well trained in night-
flying and attack.” Although, he also pointed out that Scott had requested that “anti-
Zeppelin guns should receive priority over all other orders.174  
The Final Zeppelin raid of 1915 occurred on 13 October, when a squadron of no less 
than five Zeppelins attempted a co-ordinated raid on London. The raid was reported 
in the Daily Mirror on 14 October and only included a preliminary report from the 
Admiralty stating that further details would be released when known.175 While The 
Times carried the same initial reports,176 articles and editorials over the following 
week demonstrate a high level of dissatisfaction with the state of Britain’s aerial 
defences. These included an account of a protest organised by the Globe on 14 
October in which business leaders and other people of influence had called on the 
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government to undertake reprisal raids on Germany as well as calling for the 
establishment of a properly equipped national air service.177 The issue of whether 
aeroplanes were effective in combating Zeppelins was re-visited when on 22 October 
The Times naval correspondent published an article citing several issues which 
remained to be solved in operating aeroplanes against zeppelins. In particular the 
dangers involved in landing aircraft at night as well as co-ordinating the activities of 
the aeroplanes with the anti-aircraft batteries.178 
3.4 Strengthened Defences: From Talk to Action 
The first airship raid of 1916 took place on 31 January and involved nine of the 
German Navy’s latest airships. However, due to the large area covered by the 
Zeppelin attack, British authorities were initially unable to provide much information 
on the raid.179  An article published on the same day commented on the renewed 
airship activity180 and suggested that the best means of defence against the 
Zeppelins was to ensure a supply of quick climbing aeroplanes to attack the 
Zeppelins in the air. The writer stated that he was well aware of the difficulties in 
using aeroplanes in this role but hoped that the relevant authorities would be able to 
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provide solutions to the problems.181This raid demonstrated importance of 
censorship in denying Germany accurate information on the effect of the raids and 
the precise course taken by the Zeppelins which were unable to accurately navigate 
over Britain due to the lighting regulations and bad weather. The report in The Times 
on 2 February described the damage caused as being militarily insignificant but 
stated that casualties had been heavy. The Times contrasted this with the German 
report on the raid which claimed heavy damage to Liverpool and Sheffield.182  A 
further article supported the need for censorship in denying information to the 
Germans but nevertheless also suggested that the lack of information for the British 
public would lead to rumours and wild speculation which could itself be significantly 
damaging to public morale.183 
This issue and other related questions were addressed in the House of Commons on 
16 February in a debate on the future of the air services. Joynson-Hicks, a strong 
proponent for the creation of a unified air force independent of the army or navy, 
cast himself in the role of a prophet who had delivered stark warnings prior to the 
war only to have seen them come true. He accused the government of having been 
complacent, stating that, due to the role of the press the “whole of England” was 
more aware of the possibilities of aviation than the government. After discussing the 
state of Britain’s defences and summarising the different methods of aerial defence, 
Hicks proposed that the aerial forces of the army and navy should be brought under 
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the command of an “air minister” who would have sole responsibility for the aerial 
defence of Britain.  
The M.P. Cecil Harmsworth, Lord Northcliffe’s younger brother, suggested that 
although a state of panic did not yet exist as a result of the air raids, there was a 
danger of one being created if the public were unable to trust those responsible for 
the aerial defence of the country. Harmsworth also pointed to the contrasting 
success of the Ministry of Munitions and stated that a similar department should be 
established to assume sole command of the air-services. Mr. Lynch, the MP for 
Galloway supported the amendment and when speaking in reference to Zeppelins, 
expressed the hope that Britain would not attempt to emulate the German success 
with these craft but instead should focus on the aeroplane as being more versatile 
and cost efficient than the giant airships. 184 Although the amendment was 
eventually withdrawn  the debate had aired a large number of issues which had been 
festering since 1908 and regularly raised, particularly in the Northcliffe controlled 
press. Like all other Parliamentary debates throughout the War this was reported in 
the national papers as the Hansard records were not censored.185 
As had been stated by Harold Tennant in Parliament on 16 February,186 it was not yet 
possible to provide complete protection over Britain without denuding the Western 
Front of men and machines. While London and a few select areas were well 
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defended, much of the country, particularly the North, lay open to attack. On 5/6 
March the Zeppelins made a return visit to Hull, causing severe damage and a large 
number of casualties. On 7 March the Hull Daily Mail published an in-depth report on 
the raid stating that the report had been sent to the Press Bureau early the previous 
day but that the paper had not received permission to publish in time to make use of 
it.  
In keeping with previous reports, despite the German commanders having correctly 
identified Hull, the newspaper report did not confirm the location raided although it 
did include descriptions of the damage along with eye-witness accounts of the 
raid.187 The Times also published an account of the raid, commenting on the “devious 
nature” of the Zeppelins flight and suggesting that the Zeppelins had been uncertain 
as to their location. This report also provided some descriptions of the damage and 
casualties before stressing that no military damage was done and the no soldiers had 
been killed in the attack.188  The raid was discussed in Parliament on 7 March by Mr. 
Ferens, the MP for Hull who questioned what steps were being taken to protect 
against future raids. The government declined to respond as it would not have been 
“desirable to discuss defensive measures.”189 Further reports in the Hull Daily Mail 
illustrated the outrage of the city’s population at the failure of the promised 
defences while the editor noted that the paper was unable to publish many of the 
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letters due to the censorship regulations.190 This is supported by Thomas Fegan who 
noted that the raid revealed an anti-aircraft gun, which had been mounted on a 
factory roof, to be a dummy designed to reassure the local population.191 
A further raid on 31 March was remarkable for the destruction of the German 
Naval Zeppelin L.15 by anti-aircraft fire. The raid was reported in The Times on 3 
April. The official reports from the Admiralty and the War Office which had been 
released on 1 April stated that a Zeppelin had been damaged by gunfire and 
forced down onto the sea of the Thames Estuary; the crew had been taken off 
and an unsuccessful attempt was made to tow the damaged ship, which broke 
up and sank.192 H.B. Latham describes the destruction of the L.15 as being 
significant as it was the first time an airship was destroyed over the British 
Isles.193  
Several further raids occurred during the spring of 1916 with mixed results 
ending with a failed attempt to attack Scotland; the Edinburgh Evening News 
reported that no casualties had been caused in Scotland and that one of the 
attacking ships had been wrecked in Norway.194 On 4 May a Royal Naval 
operation to draw the German fleet over British minefields resulted in the 
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destruction of the German Naval Zeppelin L.7 by British cruisers. This was soon 
reported in The Times which described the achievement as being a “good 
augury” to the recent zeppelin activity.195 Possibly the most significant Zeppelin 
raid of 1916 occurred on 2 September. A total of 16 German airships departed to 
attack Britain and all but two successfully crossed the British coastline. On 4 
September The Times reported that the raid was significant for two reasons, 
firstly the number of airships involved in the attack, which the paper numbered 
as being thirteen. Secondly, this was the first raid in which a Zeppelin was 
brought down over British soil and in the full view of “[t]housands of 
Londoners.”196  This was the Schütte-Lanz197 SL.11, which was shot 
down by Lieutenant Leefe Robinson198, flying a BE 2C199 and using incendiary 
ammunition.  Robinson was quickly awarded the V.C.200 which as Michael Paris 
pointed out demonstrated how unusual this feat was.201  
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Figure 12: Leefe Robinson, photographed at Suttons farm in 1916. 
 
Photo taken from Oxford Dictionary of National Biography. Attributed to the RAF Museum. 
Source: Canadian forces, Expired Crown copyright. 
 
Figure 11: Be2c 
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The next raid by the Zeppelins took place on 23 September when eleven 
Zeppelins attempted to reach London, according to Morris the attackers had 
learnt from the loss of the SL.11 and attempted to approach from a more 
southerly direction. Only one of the three ships attempting this route succeeded 
in penetrating London’s defences,202 causing severe casualties and damage to 
residential properties.203 The other two ships attempting this route the L.32 and 
L.33204 were both lost, one to anti-aircraft fire which punctured the gas bags 
forcing the commander to abandon his craft in Little Wigborough just outside 
Colchester in Essex.205  The L.32, was attacked by Second Lieutenant Sowrey 
flying a BE 2C, coming to ground just south of Billericay.206 The Times reported 
that both wrecks were visited by “thousands of enthusiasts” eager to see the 
fallen craft.207 The award of the D.S.O.208 rather than the V.C. appears to indicate 
that it was now expected that the Zeppelin attackers would be destroyed and 
that such an event was no longer considered to be worthy of special notice. This 
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is also demonstrated by The Times which, on 27 September, was still unable to 
report on the name of the airman responsible for the destruction of the L.32.209 
The loss of these three airships within a matter of weeks was soon followed on 
1/2 October when eleven Zeppelins set out to raid Britain. The raid was 
scattered over a wide area and achieved very little in terms of damage or 
casualties. Of greater significance was the loss of the L.31 under the command of 
Heinrich Mathy, who was widely regarded as the most successful of the Zeppelin 
commanders. The destruction of the Zeppelin was again visible for many miles 
and the site of the wreck was quickly placed under armed guard as “tens of 
thousands” of people attempted to visit the site.210 By now it appears that the 
destruction of a Zeppelin had become almost common place as there is no 
mention of the pilot involved in any report on the event until 15 October when it 
was announced that he had been awarded the D.S.O.211  
This was again followed on 27/28 November by the destruction of the L.34 by 
Second Lieutenant Pyott and the L.21 by a combination of Flight Lieutenant 
Cadbury, Flight Sub-Lieutenant Fane and Flight Sub-Lieutenant Pulling. This was 
the last airship raid of 1916 and it is evident from the reports in The Times that 
these raids where now considered to be unremarkable. Where it had once made 
every effort to acknowledge the individual pilots involved in the Zeppelins 
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destruction it now appeared that the destruction of Zeppelins at the hands of 
British pilots was to be considered the norm rather than the exception and no 
longer worthy of special mention.212   
3.5 Zeppelins Eclipsed: The Rise of the Aeroplane 
The first reported raid of 1917 occurred on 16/17 March when The Times 
reported that hostile airships had raided the south eastern counties and that 
bombs had been dropped on Kent.213 A further raid on 17 June saw the 
destruction of the L.48 by a British fighter craft;214 the paper included a detailed 
account of the airships destruction at the guns of the British pilot.215 The incident 
was particularly unusual in that several members of the Zeppelins crew survived 
to be taken prisoners.216 
On 19 October a raid occurred which became one of the best known of the 
entire war; the “silent raid” was the result of the attempt by the Zeppelins to 
escape Britain’s air defences by flying at extreme heights approaching  20,000 
feet. Due to the unpredictable winds at these heights the raiding airships were at 
the mercy of the weather and had only very limited control over their course. 
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According to Morris of the eleven Zeppelins which set out that night four were 
either destroyed or captured, and only one, the L.45, succeeded in bombing 
London.217 The Times report on 20 October stated that six or seven Zeppelins had 
been involved in a raid on eastern and north eastern counties and bombs had 
been dropped in various places including London.218 Further details followed on 
21 October describing the raid as a disaster for the Zeppelins.219 Another report 
stated that the destruction or capture of four Zeppelins in a single night 
“confirms the impression that the Zeppelins are too vulnerable to become a 
formidable feature of air warfare.” A final report on 23 October quoted experts 
as agreeing that the raid offered conclusive proof of the failure of the Zeppelin 
as a bomber.220 
Despite several attempts in 1918 the Zeppelins were unable to successfully 
penetrate Britain’s defences. The final Zeppelin raid of the war took place on 5 
August 1918. Five Zeppelins approached the Norfolk coast only to be intercepted 
by air units of the RAF. On 7 August The Times reported that the Zeppelins had 
been engaged by British aircraft and one shot down with another damaged. 
None of the Zeppelins had succeeded in crossing the English coast.221  
                                            
217 Morris 1993, pp.178-188. 
     Fegan 2012, pp. 64-66. 
218 The Times, 20 Oct. 1917, p.6. 
219 The Times, 22 Oct. 1917, p.8. 
220 The Times, 23 Oct. 1917, p.9. 
221 The Times, 7 Aug. 1918, p.6. 
- 90 - 
Between January 1915 and August 1918 the Zeppelins had carried out a total of 
fifty-one raids  dropping a total of 500,000 pounds of bombs, causing 556 deaths 
with a further 1,357 people wounded. The vast majority of these occurred in 
1915. By November 1916 Lord Grey had recorded that he believed the Zeppelin 
to be a complete failure for offensive operations and was no longer anxious 
about it.222 By the end of 1916 the cause of Vera Brittain’s “creeping dread” had 
largely been mastered. However, although the threat from the Zeppelins had 
been largely eliminated it was quickly replaced by a new and more dangerous 
threat. 
3.6 A New Threat: Gotha’s and Giants 
The Times reported on 28 May 1917 that three days earlier a large squadron of 
enemy aircraft had attacked the South-East of England, causing 76 deaths and 
174 injuries. The report also contained the official German account of the raid 
which identified Dover and Folkestone as being the targets. The raid was 
identified as having caused the highest death toll of any air raid in the war. The 
Times commented on the “perfect formation” of the attackers and mentioned 
that they were not engaged by British aircraft until the return flight.223  The 
report in the Dover Express on 1 June highlighted the fact that the raid had 
caused the greatest loss of life of any air raid thus far. There was also concern 
that such a large force had been able to attack the town without warning or 
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effective opposition.224 A further article in The Times stated that there were 
three main conclusions to be drawn from the attack. The first was that 
censorship was pointless as “beyond all question they knew prec isely where they 
were going and when they were there.” The second was that “the aeroplane not 
the Zeppelin [was] the really formidably instrument of invasion. The cumbrous 
[…] airships cannot stand comparison with these fast flying [aeroplanes].” The 
final point was “the only means of coping effectively […] [was] by an aggressive 
aeroplane policy of our own.”225 This raid was discussed in Parliament on 5 June 
during which Noel Pemberton-Billing stated that the chances of successfully 
defending against a daylight attack by heavier than air machines was small and 
that it would be even more difficult to defend against a night attack.226  
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The next major attack using aeroplanes occurred on 13 June and was the most 
devastating of the war in terms of casualties. On 14 June The Times reported 
that an initial count showed a total of 536 casualties. The response to the raid 
was especially vitriolic due to a bomb hit on an infant school,227 with renewed 
calls for reprisal raids on German towns and cities.228 Morris notes that while the 
anti-aircraft arrangements were adequate for dealing with Zeppelins they were 
not suitable for attacking massed formations of heavier than air bombers.  
The Gothas’ carried out several more daylight raids over the coming months, 
during which time the British aerial defences were strengthened further 
eventually forcing the German raiders to switch tactics and attack at night. 229 
The first major night time raid took place on 4 September and involved a force of 
at least twenty-six Gotha bombers. According to The Times eight or ten aircraft 
broke through to attack London, with further formations attacking targets 
throughout the southeast including a raid on the Naval barracks at Chatham 
which killed or injured some 193 sailors.230 Over the next few days it emerged 
that the damage and casualties in London had been remarkably light and that 
one of the German bombers had failed to return to its base.231 The raids 
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continued through September and October causing huge amounts of disruption 
as Londoners sought shelter on the Underground platforms, but did not cause 
any appreciable damage or suffer any serious casualties themselves.232 
In early 1918 the Germans began to deploy the new Giant bombers in increasing 
numbers. However, the early attacks proved disappointing for the Germans, 
although Morris did note that the size of the Giant bombers proved 
disconcerting for the defending pilots and anti-aircraft gunners who were used 
to ranging on the smaller Gothas.233 On 19 May the Germans attempted the 
largest raid of the war and as it turned out it was also the last raid carried out on 
Britain before the armistice. Morris notes that a force of approximately forty 
Gothas and Giants took part in the raid although very few of these managed to 
reach their target in London.234 The Times report on 21 May records that a 
considerable force approached London and bombed the city causing a total of 
192 casualties. However, the raiders were strongly attacked by fighters and ant -
aircraft guns with at least seven of the enemy being destroyed.235 One 
interesting feature which appeared in the Daily Mirror at this time was the 
inclusion of a table showing the last six raids on London by Gotha bombers. This 
table included the number of casualties, the number of bombers involved in the 
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raid and the number of enemy craft which were destroyed. Between 28 January 
and 19 May 1918 the Gothas had caused 582 casualties for the loss of just five 
aircraft.236 
By the end of the war German aeroplanes had caused 857 deaths and at least 
2,000 further casualties.237 The combined impact of the Zeppelin and Gotha raids 
was to have a lasting impact on the British population. The experience of the war 
appeared to indicate that the advantage lay with the aeroplane as a bomber, and 
indeed that the aeroplane appeared to be more efficient as a strategic bomber 
than the airship. This was despite the numerous advantages such as range, 
carrying capacity and safety which were demonstrated by the Zeppelins as well 
as by British airships over the course of the war, but which remained largely 
unknown and unreported. 
3.7 The British airship at war: A well-kept secret 
As was mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, British airships were 
amongst the first of Britain’s naval units to see any action in the war, with His 
Majesty’s Airship no4 patrolling the Thames Estuary and later in conjunction 
with HMA no3 patrolling the English Channel to prevent German U-Boats from 
interfering with the movement of the British Expeditionary Force to the 
continent.238 This unglamorous anti-submarine and patrol work made up the bulk 
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of British airship operations throughout the war and proved vital in sustaining 
the flow of supplies into Britain. Abbott noted that “[t]he British airships did not 
win the war by themselves, but without them the war might never have been 
won.”239  
On 28 February 1915 the First Sea Lord, Lord Fisher, had issued a specification 
for a new type of airship to protect convoys and carry out anti-submarine 
patrols; the design was to be ready without delay.240  A variety of designs were 
tested and within a month the prototype had been tested and accepted. By the 
end of the war Britain had one-hundred-and-seven airships in service including 
six rigid airships.241 The British rigid airship programme had been restarted in 
1913 in reaction to the success of the latest German Zeppelins. The programme 
was then abandoned in March 1915 on the orders of Winston Churchill, who 
believed that the war would be over before the ship could be completed and 
that it would be a waste of resources needed for other projects. However, the 
programme was reinstated in May 1915 following Churchill’s resignation in the 
wake of the Dardanelles fiasco.242 The only news released about this was part of 
a report on a debate in the House of Commons in which it was revealed that the 
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rigid airship under construction at the start of the war had finally been 
completed and was ready for trials.243  
 
Other reports highlight the general lack of information made available to the 
press about British airship operations. One, which stands out was published in 
September 1916 when a picture and caption in the Illustrated London News 
portrayed an attack on a German submarine by a British Naval Airship as a 
means of explaining how the Royal Navy was keeping Britain’s supply lines 
open.244  
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Figure 14: HMA Rigid Airship. No.9 
Source: Imperial War Museum RAE-O 948. 
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Reports of British airships occurred infrequently throughout the war. Of the few 
reports released, one, published in The Times on 24 April 1917, stands out due to 
its description of the loss of a British airship which was “seen to descend in 
flames in the straits of Dover”.245  This report correlates with the loss of the 
Coastal Class C.17 on 21 April 1917 which was reported to have been shot down 
by a German seaplane. This was apparently one of only two British airships lost 
to enemy aircraft during the entire war.246 Another notable account of a British 
airship occurred in The Times on 7 December 1917 which published an account 
of the flight of a “British “Zeppelin”” over London the previous day. The writer 
commented on the smoothness of the airships flight as well as its speed and 
response to the controls.247 
As has been previously noted the work carried out by British airships remained 
largely secret until the end of the war. By this point the airship service had been 
absorbed into the newly formed RAF, although the vessels themselves had 
remained under naval command. Abbott noted that this transfer of command 
had little immediate effect on the men flying the airships, with the only outward 
sign being the change in uniform.248 Due to the unpublicised nature of their work 
the British airships had neither the glamour nor the dread of their German 
counterparts, despite many unique and often astounding accomplishments in 
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craft which compared to the German Zeppelins could be considered primitive. It 
was not until the war had ended that books and articles began to be published 
outlining the remarkable feats carried out by British airships and their crews in 
the course of their duties. As John Swinfield notes by the end of the war the 
airship had been defined “as a tool of the military, its capability judged as an 
instrument of war.”249 
3.8 Conclusion 
I have shown that the way in which the press reported on the Zeppelin and 
Gotha raids potentially influenced opinion against the airship in two ways; firstly, 
by portraying the Zeppelins as “Murderers and Baby Killers”, emphasising the 
attacks on defenceless towns and cities as being uncivilised and outside the 
“rules of war”. Secondly, by highlighting their destruction at the hands of British 
fighter planes the papers demonstrated the superiority of the aeroplane over the 
airship. Whether this was done intentionally or not is a matter for further 
research. It is also possible that the government used the controversy 
surrounding Britain’s defence against Zeppelin attacks to divert attention from 
other theatres of the War such as the Gallipoli campaign in 1915. The 
destruction of Zeppelins during 1916 could also have provided a welcome 
distraction from the disasters on the Western Front. John Terraine noted that 
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the Gotha attacks in 1917 became the main preoccupation of the press, diverting 
attention from the threat posed to Britain’s lifeline by the German U -Boats.250  
I have demonstrated that although Zeppelins had some early success as strategic 
bombers and were able to overpower the unprepared defences of Britain, they 
proved unable to survive against strong co-ordinated defences. The Gotha 
bombers demonstrated a superior ability to survive and in a few raids caused 
more widespread damage and casualties than the combined Zeppelin raids, 
demonstrating the superiority of the aeroplane in this role. This was picked up in 
press reports, however, it is unclear to what extent these reports impacted on 
public opinions on aircraft. 
The Airships of the Royal Navy proved to have a higher rate of survivability than 
their German counterparts, according to Abbott this was because they were 
used more sensibly “being concentrated on the role at which they excelled 
[rather than] wasted on suicidal bombing missions over land.”251 However, as 
this role went largely unreported and unrecognised this could have little 
influence of the future of the airship in Britain and as will be discussed in the  
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Chapter 4 





“It is a very curious thing that the Admiralty, through 
the most amazing obstinacy, has gone on, right 
through this War, building an airship which clearly was 
of no use during the War, but now turns out to have a 
certain use from the commercial point of view.”  
Lieut.-Colonel MOORE-BRABAZON House of Commons 24 July 1919252 
 
I do not want Lord Northcliffe to run the country. 
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4.1 Introduction 
The immediate post war period saw a sharp decrease in the number of airships 
operating with the British Fleet. On 11 November 1918, there were one hundred and 
seven airships in service; by October 1919 that number was reduced to only a 
handful. Despite the rapid rundown of the service, the period between November 
1919 and August 1922 witnessed some of the most impressive aerial feats carried 
out by British airships’ including long distance flights by the North Sea Class NS.11 
and the Rigid R.34.  The same period also witnessed some of the greatest disasters to 
overtake the British airship programme, with the loss of the NS.11 in a lightning 
storm over the North Sea and the dramatic destruction of the rigid airship R.38 over 
Hull in 1921. However, I believe that these incidents are insufficient to account for 
the displacement of the airship by the aeroplane in the years following the First 
World War. 
In this chapter I demonstrate that the primary group responsible for halting the 
development of the airship in Britain was the Royal Air Force. Powers (1976), 
suggests that the Gotha raids of 1917 where a key catalyst for the creation of the 
RAF. By the end of the First World War senior officers in the RAF as well as 
prominent politicians, such as Lloyd George, had come to believe that strategic 
bombing offered a means of warfare which would avoid the costly land battles of the 
Great War.254 As was concluded in the previous chapter, German forces had found 
the Zeppelin to be unsuitable for use as a strategic bomber when compared to fixed 
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wing aircraft such as the Gotha, an assessment which many British air force officers 
and politicians agreed with. In July 1919, Captain William Benn, the MP for Leith, 
spoke in the House of Commons stating that “as a fighting weapon the Zeppelin is a 
failure.”255 In contrast, British naval airships had been successful in carrying out anti-
submarine patrols suffering minimal casualties. However, as was indicated in the 
previous chapter, this went largely unreported in the press at the time. In attempting 
to secure its new dominant position the Royal Air Force was willing to sacrifice the 
airship, which being viewed as a primarily naval or civilian craft, threatened to divert 
Air Ministry funds from areas deemed to be more vital to the ‘mission’ of the RAF 
such as the development long distance heavy bombers. 
I examine the way in which the Northcliffe press epitomized in The Times reported 
on four key events relating to British airships during this period: Firstly, the Long 
distance flight of the ‘North Sea ‘ class airship NS.11 in February 1919, followed, 
secondly, by the loss of that ship in July the same year. Thirdly, I examine the record-
breaking flight of the R.34 to America and back comparing the coverage to that 
received by Alcock and Brown’s transatlantic crossing the previous month. Finally I 
examine the loss of the R.38 over Hull in 1921 and the impact this had on public and 
military audiences mediated by the press as well as through direct personal 
experience. In addition to this I examine the role and fate of the airship in the 
struggle between the Military and Civil branches of aviation in Britain. Due to its 
expense and potential as an aerial liner the airship had become symbolic of civil 
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aviation in Britain. Advocates of civil aviation, such as Lord Northcliffe, feared that 
attempts by the Air Ministry to abandon development of airships would spill over 
into other areas of civil aviation with disastrous consequences for British Aviation. In 
an attempt to combat this, Lord Northcliffe to used his newspapers to argue the case 
for the ongoing development of the airship in post war Britain. I begin with an 
examination of the non-rigid airship NS.11, one of the first airships to be discussed in 
the press following the end of wartime censorship.  
4.2 Record Breaker: NS.11 
 
Figure 15: NS11 at Cranwell. 
Source: www.ns11.org. 
 
The North Sea class airship was developed out of a 1916 Admiralty requirement for a 
non-rigid airship, capable of operating with the Fleet as a stopgap until the next 
generation of large rigid airships came into commission beginning in 1918.256 The 
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ships were required to be capable of carrying out extended patrols of at least 
twenty-four hours. The North Sea Class was the first British designed non-rigid 
airship to feature a fully enclosed control car allowing the crew of ten to operate in 
shifts, even providing facilities to cook hot meals. In terms of speed, endurance and 
lifting power, the performance of the North Sea class airships was comparable to the 
wartime rigid airships built by the Royal Navy. However, they were also quicker, 
easier and cheaper to build.257  
In 1919 one particular airship of this class came to the attention of the press. The 
NS.11 was involved in multiple record-breaking flights beginning with a sixty-one 
hour patrol carried out on 17-19 November 1918. This was followed on 9 February 
1919 by a 101-hour flight covering a distance of over 1400 miles. There is no record 
of whether these flights were deliberate attempts to set new world records. This 
second flight was discussed during a House of Commons debate, by Major-General 
Seely, in order to demonstrate the advances made in aviation and the Air Ministry’s 
commitment to promoting air travel by any means.258 The story was reported in the 
Aberdeen Journal on 22 February, which referred to Seely’s speech connecting it with 
the flight of an airship from Longside,259 which had passed over Aberdeen the 
previous week.260 However, despite the record breaking nature of the flight, it was 
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not mentioned in the Northcliffe owned Times. Between 16 and 18 March 1919 the 
ship undertook a further long distance flight, remaining airborne for forty hours 
during which time it covered a distance of 1,285 air miles and made a circuit of the 
North Sea.261 This was reported in local and regional Newspapers such as the 
Aberdeen Journal.262 The Times also carried the story although there was a greater 
focus on the weather problems experienced during the flight. Pointing to the ease 
with which these problems had been overcome and describing the flight as “among 
the most notable flights that have ever been undertaken … [and] the longest non-
stop oversea voyage of any British aircraft”.263 However, this record was soon to be 
challenged. 
4.3 Race to Cross the Atlantic: Aeroplane vs. Airship / Britain vs. 
United States 
The race to complete a nonstop transatlantic flight had begun prior to the First 
World War in 1913 when Lord Northcliffe had offered a £10,000 prize for the first 
crossing of the Atlantic in seventy-two consecutive hours. The competition had been 
suspended for the duration of the First World War but was reinstated in November 
1918. Entrants from the United States and Great Britain made attempts for the prize, 
which was only open to aeroplanes.264  
Alcock and Brown: Non-stop across the Atlantic. 
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The Air Force had been beaten to the first non-stop crossing of the Atlantic by 
Alcock265 and Brown,266 who had landed in Ireland on 15 June 1919 after a flight, 
from the United States, lasting fifteen hours and fifty-seven minutes in a modified267 
version of the Vickers Vimy bomber.268  
Figure 16: Vickers Vimy Bomber, 1918. 
Source: Royal Air force Museum. Crown Copyright Expired. 
In The Water Jump: The story of Transatlantic Flight, David Beaty comments that the 
British Government played little role in the attempt to cross the Atlantic, the effort 
being left to “British individuals and aircraft manufacturers,”269 This was 
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demonstrated during a Parliamentary discussion in May 1919 when the possibility 
was raised of using British Naval vessels to rescue any fliers forced down in the 
Atlantic. The proposal was mooted as it would require more personnel to remain on 
active duty and conflicted with demands for demobilisation.270 The flight had been in 
the papers from early May 1919 when on 6 May The Times published an account of a 
new entrant for the Daily Mail Prize sponsored by Vickers and Rolls Royce giving a 
description of the plane and a brief description of Alcock and Brown’s backgrounds 
and military service.271 This interest was also evident in other newspapers such as 
the Evening Telegraph, which, on 9 May published a picture of the two men.272  
 The details of the flight were reported in The Times on 16 June In an article, which 
labelled Alcock and Brown as heroes. It reported that the aviators had won the 
£10,000 prize273 from the Daily Mail and had received letters of welcome from the 
King and from Lord Northcliffe, congratulating them on the achievement and 
speculating on what it would mean for future relations between Britain and America. 
During the interview with the correspondent Alcock made the suggestion that while 
his flight demonstrated that flying across the Atlantic was practical it should be done 
using a flying-boat rather than a sea-plane or aeroplane making no mention of the 
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possibility of using airships in this role.274 This was tempered by a further article in 
the same issue which pointed to the upcoming voyage of the R.34, suggesting that it 
“may reveal undisclosed qualities” in lighter than air craft.275 The scale of celebration 
surrounding Alcock and Brown's achievement, including the Knighthoods received by 
both men276 was reported in The Times over the next few days277 and as will be seen 
stands in stark contrast to the welcome received by the crew of the rigid airship R.34 
on their return to Britain.  
There and back again: A Much Reported Journey 
The R.34 was one of the 33 class rigid airships, which were based on the design of 
the German naval Zeppelin L.33, which as mentioned in the previous chapter, had 
been shot down outside Colchester in September 1916. Work was begun on the R.34 
on 17 December 1917, with the ship being completed just over a year later on 20 
December 1918: too late to play a role in the Great War. After completing trials the 
Air Ministry decided that the ship would be used in an attempt to cross the Atlantic 
in both directions. This would demonstrate that they were just as capable of 
operating airships over the sea as the Royal Navy, thus defeating one of the 
arguments for returning control of all airships to the Royal Navy.  
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As has been mentioned the R.34's impending flight to America and back was 
overshadowed by Alcock and Brown's arrival in Ireland. Prior to departure the R.34’s 
flight did receive several mentions in The Times including a report of a trial flight 
along the coast of Germany and Scandinavia which lasted for sixty hours and 
according to The Times covered a distance of between two-thousand and two-
thousand-five-hundred miles, which the writer suggested boded well for the Atlantic 
flight.278 On 1 July 1919 The Times carried a detailed full-page report on the 
upcoming voyage of the R.34. This report gave details of the proposed course before 
going on to give a detailed description of the ship and its equipment. It also included 
a section on the day-to-day operation of the airship, likening it to an ocean going 
vessel in the way the crew was organised. This section also mentioned the possibility 
of the passenger carrying airships in the future.279  On 2 July The Times published two 
further articles, the first wishing the crew good luck on the voyage280 and the second 
reporting on the departure of the airship from East Fortune Airship Base, giving an 
account of the preparations made on the previous day. This latter report also named 
and described the senior officers on board, giving a brief account of their careers and 
experience.281 The Times reporting continued on 3 July with copies of Wireless 
messages received from the airship as well as a more detailed account of the launch. 
The paper also reported on the American preparations for the R.34's arrival, 
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commenting on the numbers of people expected to turn out to watch the airship 
landing. However, a further news item on the same page reports on the explosion of 
an American airship the previous day282 thus highlighting one of the potential 
dangers or airship travel. However, it is somewhat unclear as to how many readers 
would continue past the end of the main story. 
The reporting continued throughout the voyage, and it is evident that some official 
effort was being made to downplay the voyage. On 4 July The Times noted that “it 
was originally intended that the public should be able to follow […] the flight of the 
R.34 across the Atlantic, […] a huge chart was to have been erected in Trafalgar 
square […] The scheme was not allowed to develop and only those whose business 
takes them to the Air Ministry can see anything of the sort.283 An article on 5 July 
stated that the current voyage had re-opened the “war-time controversy of the 
airship vs. the aeroplane.” The writer pointed to the safety of airships compared to 
aeroplanes when operating in fog stating that the only obstacles to be overcome 
were related to cost.284 Cost was a key issue for the post war government, which was 
wary of being seen to spend excessive amounts of money developing military 
technology and the airship service was uniquely vulnerable due to its uncertain 
position between the Navy and Air Force as well as the uncertainty surrounding its 
use for either military or civilian roles.  
 
                                            
282 The Times, 3 July 1919, p.12+. 
283 The Times, 4 July 1919, p.14. 
284 The Times, 5 July 1919, p.13+. 
- 113 - 
 
Figure 17: Landing of the R-34 at Mineola, Long Island, N.Y. 1919. 
 
The R.34 landed in the United States on 6 July 1919, this was reported in The Times 
the following day. The article describes the airships reception by a “crowd of 
thousands,” giving account of the voyage taken from the airships logbook.285 On the 
same day an editorial criticised the balance of spending between military and civil 
aviation, implying that it limited the development of civilian aircraft to those that the 
military had use for.286 This attitude is unsurprising as during the War Lord 
Northcliffe had been appointed to a committee charged with developing civil 
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aviation after the war.287 There is also some evidence to suggest that Northcliffe had 
a significant editorial role in all of his papers. In The real Lord Northcliffe, Louise 
Owen, his private secretary, wrote that, Northcliffe held an editorial meeting every 
afternoon and would often alter decisions already made by his editors.288 More 
recently Thompson notes that although Northcliffe had allowed The Times to pursue 
a semi-independent course for much of the War, this did not continue beyond July 
1918,289 indicating a desire to more directly influence the contents of the paper on 
key issues such as aviation. 
Reports in The Times over the next few days dwelt on the reception of the airship 
and its crew by the Americans as well as on what the success of the complete voyage 
would mean for the future of air travel between the two countries and other distant 
parts of the world.290 General Maitland gave an interview in which he confidently 
predicted that airships would take over the role of ocean liners within a few years.291 
Problems with the weather and the need to carry out a number of repairs to the ship 
delayed the return flight, extending the planned refuelling stop of eight hours to 
three days, finally departing in strong winds just prior to midnight on 10 July.292  
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The R.34’s return flight was covered in much the same manner as the flight out with 
The Times reporting on the progress of the voyage, quoting from the wireless 
transmissions received from the ship. The report also included a further account 
General Maitland's vision of airship travel in the future, describing the possibility of a 
ship five times larger than the R.34 and expressing the hope that within five years he 
would be able to pilot such a craft across the Atlantic. 
However, it is significant that this report also included a section on the flight of two 
flying boats between Felixstowe and Dundee, which had taken six hours, the plan of 
the voyage being to fly to Sweden and Denmark, mapping out a route for a 
commercial flying boat service.293 This final section indicates that whatever the 
promise of lighter-than-air craft, commercial aviation had a more immediate future 
in the utilization of the aeroplane and flying boat. 
After the attention granted to the voyage itself, the airships return to Britain was 
muted, standing in stark contrast to the reception of its arrival in America. A report 
in The Times on 14 July stated that the ship had successfully landed at Pulham airship 
base in Norfolk after a seventy-five hour fight. No report was made of the greeting 
received by the ship and its crew, although The Times did suggest that there was no 
greater example of the pioneering work carried out by British airmen without 
“adequate encouragement from the state.”294 This was followed by an article on 15 
July, which after reporting that the airship despite some damage was still capable of 
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flight, went on to describe the visit of the airships crew to London, stating that “the 
general public at [Liverpool street] station seemed to be unaware of the identity of 
the visitors, and there was no demonstration.”295 In R.34 Twice Across the Atlantic, 
Ian Bunyan states that no reason was ever given for the change in destination from 
East Fortune to Pulham, he further points to the small crowd and Royal Air Force 
band which had gathered to welcome the ship and crew at the suddenly re-
designated landing sight.296 In comparison to Alcock and Brown, the officers and 
crew of the R.34 went unrewarded; on 25 August 1919 The Times reported that 
Major Scott had been awarded the CBE297 while four other crew members were 
awarded the Air Force Cross298. Beaty notes that on receiving the crew, King George 
V appeared to me more interested in the pigeons carried on-board the airship than 
in the voyage itself.299  This lack of interest was also evident in Parliament. Between 
17 July and 22 December 1919 the R.34 was only mentioned sixteen times, often not 
in relation to the flight but instead as part of debates on the financial costs of 
aviation. One of the results of this was the by 27 October 1919 it had been decided 
to sell the as yet uncompleted R.38 to the United States Navy.300  
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4.4 A Commercial Future  
The R.38 airship was based on the design of the late war German height climbers 
such as the L.48, which had been brought down in Suffolk in June 1917. The L.48 was 
an example of a height climber; these Zeppelins had been designed to fly above the 
altitude of the British aerial defences; as such the ship was designed with a 
lightweight hull in order to achieve the desired altitude. The consequences of this 
design choice where not obvious to the British design team, which, according to 
Swinfield, had copied the designs without fully understanding them with, as was 
demonstrated by the R.38, tragic consequences.301 
The rundown of the British Airship Service had begun on the declaration of the 
Armistice in 1918. By 2 September 1919 The Times reported on the Government 
decision to halt airship construction and the potential sale of airships and facilities 
for commercial development. It quoted from an unidentified source who, believed 
that the “Government’s decision to discontinue the building of airships, far from 
being a step in the direction of economy, will deal the country its death blow so far 
as aviation is concerned.” In fact this would allow countries such as America, France 
and Germany, to take the lead in the air. The paper also quoted a Mr. Golightly, the 
superintendent in charge of the R.39 who warned that in opposing lighter-than-air 
development, the supporters of heavier-than-air craft would ultimately be hurting 
themselves.302  A further article on 4 September suggested that the firms producing 
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airships had been shocked by the Governments decision to halt development. An 
unidentified official at the Armstrong works near Selby suggested that some firms 
would attempt to construct airships for commercial purposes on their own but that 
there was some doubt as to whether it would be possible for firms to continue 
without the Government subsidies.303 During this period Parliamentary debates only 
refer to airships or the airship service in reference to its position between the Navy 
and Air Force, with only the occasional mention being made of the promise of the 
airship for civilian use and even when the topic was considered economics played a 
dominant role in the debate. One debate which stands out occurred on 26 
November 1919 when Lieutenant Commander Kenworthy asked Winston Churchill 
about the numbers of rigid airships in commission or under construction and the 
estimated costs of the Airship service over the next year. Churchill noted that it was 
not possible to show separate estimates for any part of the Air Force.304 
The R.33 
In an apparent effort to convince commercial enterprise to take over airship 
development the Air Ministry sent the R.33, sister ship to the R.34, fitted out as an 
aerial liner and carrying ten passengers on a thirty-six hour trip Belgium and France. 
The flight carried a well-known professional chef and waiter305 in an attempt to 
demonstrate the possibilities of luxury airship travel. The flight also boasted the first 
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“aerial edition of The Times” which was printed on board the Airship while in flight. 
The Times reported that on their return to Pulham all the passengers were 
“convinced of the great possibilities … in the realm of commercial flight by the 
medium of the dirigible.”306 On 20 Sept an editorial response to a letter in The Times 
which, had questioned the government’s motive in abandoning the airship and 
pointed to its value as a scout for the fleet as well as the commercial possibilities of 
the airship,307 suggested that the airship had a clear future as passenger and cargo 
carriers, and would be invaluable in providing quick communications across the 
British Empire. The writer also commented that Government assistance would be 
essential in the development of the airship due to the expense involved.308  
Aerial Liners 
On 20 July 1920 The Times reported on the launch of a brand new airship, 
constructed by Vickers Ltd. Although smaller than the R.34, the R.80, designed by 
Barnes Wallis,309 was reported as being technically superior to all previous designs 
and it was hoped that the ships design would provide the basis for future ships.310 
While not placed in direct competition with earlier designs, which had been copied 
from the German Zeppelins, the report does emphasize the improved capabilities of 
the design particularly in terms of speed and lift. According to John Swinfield the 
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R.80 had originally been commissioned by the Royal Navy as a reconnaissance airship 
but was completed to a commercial design after the after the Air Ministry pulled out 
in the summer of 1919. A plan was developed to use the ship on a regular service 
between London, Paris and Rome, carrying up to thirty passengers and four-hundred 
pounds of mail. Vickers had estimated that it would cost about £600,000 to set up 
the service.311  This airship-focused vision of aerial liners was picked up by the press. 
On 17 September 1920 an article in The Times, discussed the potential of the airship 
as a means of connecting England with remote locations in the British Empire such as 
India or Australia.  The writer mentioned a talk by Commander Sir Trevor Dawson of 
the Royal Navy who pointed out that a flight between England and Australia by 
aeroplane had required twenty-eight stops to refuel compared with the mere two 
which he calculated would be required by an airship. The report highlighted the 
Commander’s talk, focusing on the estimated costs of establishing such a service and 
questioning whether it should be owned by private firms or by the State, with 
Dawson suggesting that the infrastructure should be run by the state while the 
aircraft themselves and the commercial service should be privately owned.312 
A further report on 27 October 1920 emphasised that airships were already capable 
of carrying out such flights, the article pointed to the flight of a German Zeppelin 
between Jamboli in Bulgaria and German East Africa and back between 17 and 25 
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November 1917.313 The airship was the L.59 which was specially lengthened to 
undertake the journey, although the ship was unable to carry out its primary mission 
to resupply the German forces in East Africa, the flight was a remarkable undertaking 
covering a distance of 4,200 miles and remaining airborne for 95 hours.314 
R34’s Final Flight 
On 28 January 1921 the R.34, the airship that had made the successful dual crossing 
of the Atlantic, struck a hill while on a training flight. This caused severe damage to 
some of the engines and the wireless, with further damage to the control car as well 
as to some of the girders. Temporarily out of control the ship was blown out to sea 
before the officer in command managed to get the damaged ship back under control 
and eventually bring it in to land at Howden airship station. Due to the strong winds 
the ground crew were unable to return the ship to the shelter of the shed and by the 
following morning the ship had been damaged beyond economic repair.315 The 
incident was reported in The Times on 29/31 January, the first report included 
speculations as to why the ship had crashed before noting the safe return of the ship 
to its base. The second report commented on the damage caused by the winds due 
to the mooring arrangements. Both reports highlight the difficulties of operating 
airships in high winds and point to the need for a safe form of mooring apparatus at 
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all airship stations, pointing out that such a mooring apparatus did exist but was not 
installed for financial reasons.316 
4.5 Closing the Service: A Necessary measure or False Economy 
By February 1921 the Air Ministry had come to the decision to disband the airship 
service, this decision was discussed in The Times on 1 February when it reported that 
the RAF was no longer going to operate lighter than air craft and that all rigid airships 
and their equipment were to be transferred to the civil aviation authorities. The 
report pointed out that only a few airworthy rigid airships remained in the country, 
the wooden framed R.32 and the R.80, which the paper described as being out of 
date. The R.33 was mentioned as already being under civil control and a further 
three ships were under construction, one of which the R.38, had been sold to 
America. The report goes on to suggest several options for the future of airship 
operations in Britain, including the transfer of control back to the Royal Navy for use 
as reconnaissance vessels. Other options included sale to foreign powers or for the 
ships and bases to be turned over to a civil syndicate to operate a commercial 
service. The writer again pointed out that the cost of operating airships could prove 
to be prohibitive without Government assistance.317 An Editorial on the following day 
suggested that the transfer of the airships to civil control could well be the best 
option describing commercial development of aviation as “the best preparation for 
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the military needs of the future.” The writer outlines the routes on which it is 
believed that the airship should operate on but again questioned where the money 
for these operations would come from.318  
The Government view on the airship was elucidated in March 1921 by Winston 
Churchill, who stated that,” I do not say for a moment that [airships] are not good 
objects in themselves if only we had the money for them, but when it comes to 
cutting in upon necessities in order to provide what, after all, at their best are 
conveniences, surely we should be committing a very great folly. Let us see what 
would happen if such a course were adopted. First of all the present Air Force, 
moderate in scale, modest in demeanour, modern in outlook, would go to pieces. Its 
organisation would be completely broken up.”319 Churchill also pointed out that the 
Government was perfectly happy to “give away” the ships and facilities providing a 
strong business case could be put forwards which would not rely on government 
support.320 
The R.33 distinguished itself during this period, having been placed at the disposal of 
the Metropolitan police for traffic control321 during the Derby races.322 This was 
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reported in The Times as having been a complete success with observers on the ship 
being able to spot traffic problems and redirect the flow of traffic by radiotelephone 
to officers on the ground.323 It is likely that this flight was part of an attempt by the 
government to attract interest from commercial syndicates to the possibility of 
taking over the British airships.  A report in The Times on 31 May indicated that 
unless an agreement had been reached by August all airships and facilities would be 
handed over to the Disposal Board as the Air Ministry felt unable to justify continued 
expenditure.324  
By 4 June 1921 the R.38 had been completed for the United States Navy, The Times 
gave a description of the ship comparing its capabilities to those of the R.34325 the 
report commented on the increased range and speed of the airship and gave some 
indication what this would mean in terms of travel between continents suggesting 
that journeys from Pulham to Tokyo would be possible. However, it does mention 
any possible implications for future airship development or operation in Britain.  
Shortly after this on 7 June The Times was able to report on possible plans for an 
Imperial Air Route between Britain and the Dominions which would have involved 
the Dominion governments in providing funding for the scheme which would provide 
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for faster communications throughout the Empire as well as providing an established 
scouting force for the Navy in times of war.326 
The R.38’s maiden flight took place on Thursday 23 June 1921 and was reported in 
The Times on the 25 June. The report did not contain any new information, although 
the paper does state that the design was entirely British327, a claim which airship 
historians such as John Swinfield have disputed describing the ship as being a bad 
copy of the German height climbers.328 
4.6 Saving the Service: The Imperial Conference 
In July 1921, In light of the completion of the R.38 and the £40,000,000 that had 
been spent on airship development in Britain The Times began a campaign to save 
British airships from the scrapheap, calling for proper experimentation to assess 
whether the airship had any value for commercial or military use. The paper pointed 
out that all the airships currently in existence were based on wartime designs and 
requirements and that given the chance more powerful and versatile ships could be 
developed. The Times stated that the sum of £250,000 suggested by the department 
of civil aviation to complete the current trials was not enough but that given 
£750,000 a complete set of trials could be carried out in order to establish the 
success or failure of the airship for commercial transport.329 As an example of the 
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possible progress the paper pointed to the development of the mooring mast which 
enabled airships to dock and land in winds of up to 40mph which was a he advantage 
over ships which were reliant on enclosed sheds for protection It also made it 
considerably cheaper to operate airships as the large expensive sheds would now 
only be required for construction and maintenance work. However, the paper went 
on to point out that numerous other issues still needed to be addressed and that to 
do so would cost money. The Times called on the British Government and Dominions 
to raise the money required claiming that if successful the improved communications 
links would benefit the entire British Empire. It was also stated that the failure to 
rescue the airship would amount to wastage of the “most extravagant kind”.330  
Shortly after this the paper reported that the Parliamentary Air committee had met 
with the Secretary of State for Air in order to urge the preservation of the Airships 
and bases; while no details could be released the Times noted that the committee 
received a gratifying response reviving hopes that the airship would be saved for 
Imperial travel. The paper again pointed to the vast distances involved, stating that 
heavier-than-air-craft were as yet unable to safely and economically cross.331 The 
Times went on to raise the possibility that if Britain does not develop a fleet of 
airships capable of crossing large oceans then others will, pointing to a possible 
alliance between Germany and America.332 Due to the summer recess there are no 
                                            
330The Times, 4 July 1921, p.13. 
     The Times, 4 July 1921, p.13+. 
     The Times, 9 July 1921, p.11. 
331The Times, 14 July 1921, p.11. 
332The Times, 14 July 1921, p.11. 
- 127 - 
Parliamentary records available during this period making it difficult to ascertain the 
motives behind this apparent change of tack by the Secretary of State. 
On 19/20 July 1921 The Times reported on the formation of a special committee to 
investigate the possibility of using airships to establish a commercial service 
connecting the Empire, as well as for “service purposes”.333 The committee was also 
to consider whether aeroplanes could also be used in these roles.334 The earlier of 
these two reports commented on the role of Winston Churchill in opposing the 
development of the airship stating that “He has never … concealed his disbelief in, 
and dislike for, airships. […]” The writer went on to note that despite his opposition 
to the airship Churchill would at least give it a fair trial, noting that “impatient refusal 
to recognise [the possibilities of the airship] would be the mark of a small man. Mr. 
Churchill is not that […] we do not share the fears of those who see in his 
appointment […] the doom of the British airship.”335   
A report in The Times on 22 July indicated that there was some confusion as to the 
practical issues associated with the airship. According to The Times only two choices 
existed; either to completely and immediately abandon the airship or to allow time 
and funding in order to carry out a complete set of tests and trial. The writer noted 
that the committee had suggested that the trials might be concluded over the course 
of a “few months” pointing out that various issues such as the lack of overseas 
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mooring facilities would need to be addressed before any useful trial could be 
carried out. These preparations would, in themselves, take several months.336 A 
further article on 28 July 1921 pointed out that finance had become the “overriding 
element” in deciding whether or not to support continued development of the 
airship.337  On the same day The Times published a letter which reiterated the 
arguments in favour of the airship before concluding that it was vital that the British 
Empire develop airships or risk disaster due to failure to provide modern 
equipment.338 
On Monday 1 August The Times reported that the committee had recommended 
further development and that it was likely the decision would be endorsed by the full 
conference and if this happened it was likely that the British Government would also 
agree to continue funding. The article goes on to suggest that if it was decided to go 
ahead with the funding that it would be a worthwhile investment; stating that, 
within ten years it would be considered inconceivable that there had ever been any 
reluctance to invest in airship technology.339  By 3 August 1921 the Dominion 
Ministers had voted to save the airships while they consulted with their respective 
Parliaments. The Times criticized the extreme secrecy surrounding the deliberations 
and looked forwards to the reports and documents being released for study. The 
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article again mentioned that financial constraints lay at the heart of the issue but 
that the costs would be spread over several years rather than coming as a single 
lump expenditure.340   
4.8 R.38: The Humber Tragedy 
With the future of the airship at least temporarily secure The Times returned its 
focus to the R.38, and examined the plans for the ships upcoming voyage to America. 
On 6 August The Times reported that the ship had still not been formally handed 
over to the American crew and no precise date had yet been set to the ships 
departure for the United States. It was also mentioned that the ship still needed to 
complete the last of its acceptance trials.341 
On 23 August The Times reported on the concerns of the Australian Prime Minister, 
Mr Hughes, who feared that the hostility of the Air Ministry towards the airship 
might undermine the wishes of the Dominion Prime Ministers before they could 
secure funding from their own Parliaments. The Times went on to suggest that the 
treatment of the airship by the Air Ministry also raised several questions about the 
relative importance of commercial and military aviation suggesting that the former 
had so far suffered in comparison to the latter.342  These fears were confirmed on 27 
October 1921 the matter was raised in the House of Lords by Lord Nunburnilolme 
who raised concerns that Howden airship station was being dismantled. Lord Gorrell 
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replied that as a result of the Imperial Conferences no decision could be made about 
the airships or stations until the Dominion Prime Ministers had been able to consult 
with their respective Parliaments.343  
Icarus in the Humber 
However, in August 1921, a disaster occurred which put an end to any plans for the 
further development of the airship and likely influenced the Dominion Parliaments to 
reject plans for an Imperial Airship route. On 25 August the Times reported that the 
R.38 had exploded and fallen into the river Humber while flying over the city of Hull 
the previous day. Only five out of the forty-nine people on board survived the 
explosion. Of the seventeen American airmen on board only one survived. The Air 
Ministry did not yet know what had caused the incident.344 From interviews with the 
survivors it emerged that the incident had taken place while the controls were being 
tested at high speeds, several petrol tanks are known to have exploded and the ship 
broke into at least two parts.345 The Times also mentioned unconfirmed reports that 
there had been several issues revealed in the ships structure during previous tests; 
while these defects were supposedly corrected the editors surmised that they may 
have at least in part reoccurred. The paper called for a full enquiry but also stated 
that there is risk in all great accomplishments and that from disasters such as this 
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great lessons could be learned suggesting that to do otherwise would dishonour the 
men who had died in the ship.346 
  
Figure 18: Airship R-38/ZR-2 makes its first trial flight at Cardington. 
Source: US Navy Historical Centre. 
Inquest and Enquiry 
The initial inquest as reported in The Times on 4 October 1921 returned a verdict of 
accidental death due to the breaking of the airship owing to unknown causes. The 
Coroner had questioned all the survivors excluding the captain, who was still in 
hospital, as well as several members of the construction team. All concerned stated 
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that up until the airship broke apart everything had seemed normal and they had 
been happy with the condition of the ship.347  
This was followed on 8 October, by a report of the Air Ministry investigation into the 
incident. This report in essence shifted any blame for the incident from the Air 
Ministry to the Admiralty, concluding that the ship had been designed to Admiralty 
specifications and that much of the work had been completed while the Admiralty 
was still in control of the Airship Service. It was further concluded that the design 
had never undergone the level of scrutiny, which a new design of this type required. 
The report also stated that the system of work at the airship factory was unsound as 
the same team responsible for construction was also responsible for inspecting the 
ship.348 The report also noted that the final stages of construction had been rushed 
but concluded that this had no impact on the quality of the workmanship. The 
Admiralty responded by announcing that it would conducts its own enquiry into the 
initial stages of construction up until the transfer to the Air Ministry in October 
1919.349 The Admiralty report, released in January 1922, found no issues with the 
Admiralty designs or procedures pointing out that at the time of construction the 
only people qualified to comment on the design where already engaged in working 
on it.350 
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The final report by the Aeronautical Research Committee into the R.38 incident was 
covered by The Times on 22 February. The report concluded that the R.38 was lost 
due to poor design caused by the lack of calculations on the part of the design staff 
into the aerodynamic stresses on the Hull during high-speed manoeuvres. The report 
made recommendations for future airship design, including the use of theoretical 
and physical models.351  The Times commented that, “in the study of the science of 
flying too much haste not only means less speed but, as bitter experience has shown, 
brings disaster in its train.”352 
On 7 March 1922 The Times reported on the decision by the Government to cease 
funding research into airships, all remaining airships and materials were to be turned 
over to the Disposals Board. The report states that the decision was made due to the 
unwillingness of the Dominion Parliaments, with the exception of Australia, to fund 
an Imperial airship Service. No mention is made of the R.38 disaster, although it is 
likely that the incident will have influenced the decision by both the Dominion and 
British Parliaments to abandon the airship as a commercial and military vehicle.353 
4.9 Conclusion 
Guy Hartcup describes the early 1920’s as “The Uncertain Years”, a description which 
certainly holds true for the period between 1919 and 1922. As I suggest at the 
beginning of this chapter this period witnessed both the dramatic success and also 
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failure of the airship in Britain. However, despite the unstinting support of the 
Northcliffe press for all forms of aviation, the airship was unable to entirely shake off 
the stigma of the German Zeppelins particularly in the plans of the Air Force. For the 
post war Government, finance played a huge role, particularly the desire to reduce 
spending on armaments which affected all three of Britain’s military forces, 
especially the Royal Air Force, which was struggling to justify its existence in the post 
war world. The limited resources available forced the Air Ministry to make some 
tough choices and the rigid airship, favoured by the Navy due to its superior range 
and payload, had already been identified as an expensive technology that was not 
yet commercially or militarily viable and as such made an easy target despite the 
striking success of the R.34.   
In many ways the high profile nature of the airship worked against it, not least in 
terms of the accidents to the NS.11 and the R.38, which played out in a very public 
manner reminiscent of the highly visible destruction of the German Zeppelins during 
the War.  It is probable that this would have served to reinforce the opinion of 
politicians in favour of heavier-than-air technology. 
A further aspect of the R.38 incident was the political embarrassment caused by the 
loss of the American crew members as well as the loss through “bad design” of a 
highly complex and expensive airship for which America had already paid a 
substantial amount, and Britain, having failed to deliver the goods had to pay back. 
Additionally, the death of General Maitland in the R.38 meant that the British Airship 
Service lost one of its most ardent and articulate supporters at a crucial time.  This 
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was compounded in August 1922 by the death of Lord Northcliffe depriving British 
civil aviation of one of its strongest and most powerful supporters. 
The R.38 was not the last British venture with airships during this period, although it 
was to take a great deal of political wrangling amongst politicians and the Service 
Departments of the Air Ministry and Admiralty to revive airship construction in 
Britain. A venture which, was destined to be short lived, ending in the burnt 
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“With the death of Lord Northcliffe […] Aviation in 
particular must for many years mourn the loss of this 
great enthusiast and far seeing genius.” 
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5.1 Summary of the Argument  
The period between 1909 and 1922 saw dramatic developments in the field of 
aviation. Historians of the British aviation industry, such as David Edgerton have 
tended to focus primarily on the aeroplane, as embodied by landplanes such as the 
Vickers Vimy bomber,355 pointing to the dramatic improvements in performance, 
such as speed, range, and carrying capability, while largely ignoring the parallel 
development of the airship during the same period. However, in this study I have 
shown that, the airship, in particular the rigid airship maintained a significant lead in 
terms of range and carrying capacity over any other form of aerial transport. Yet, by 
the end of 1921 development of the airship had largely been abandoned in Britain.  
My thesis has been devoted to explaining this apparent paradox.  This paradox is 
easier to explain if one looks at the power of the press to mould technological 
developments linked to the First World War: a point on which mainstream literature 
on the power of the press e.g. Curran and Seaton, Power Without Responsibility, has 
tended to say little or nothing. 
To compensate for that lack of scholarship on that topic, in this dissertation I have 
demonstrated that the press, led by Lord Northcliffe, had maintained a significant 
degree of interest in aviation in early 20th Century Britain and had at times 
attempted to manipulate the discussion in order to steer official policy. As discussed 
in chapter two, prior to the First World War the Northcliffe led press had consistently 
called for greater government and military efforts to develop British aviation, often 
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highlighting foreign developments and the potential threat posed by these to the 
safety and security of Britain. The phantom airship scares of 1909 and 1913 had 
raised the profile of the airship in Britain, demonstrating the potential of this type of 
aircraft in terms of range, as well as the inability of the British Government to 
prevent foreign aircraft flying over the country. Although no direct contrast was 
drawn between the success of the German Zeppelins and the failure of British 
designs such as the Mayfly, the apparent inability of the British military to counter 
the perceived threat created a culture of fear reported in the British and German 
press. 
As was demonstrated in chapter three, this fear was heightened and exaggerated by 
the early wartime impact of the German Zeppelins in attacking British towns and 
cities and the apparent inability of the armed forces to prevent these attacks. The 
way in which this was reported in the British press, particularly in the Northcliffe 
owned Times, contributed to what Vera Brittain had described as a “creepy dread of 
Zeppelins”. By mid-1916 the development of improved fixed defences as well as 
aeroplanes such as the BE 2C capable of intercepting the Zeppelins served to provide 
a further reason to fear the Zeppelins, as for the first time people witnessed and 
read about the dramatic fiery destruction of these  airships over southern Britain.356 
Contrast this with an almost complete blackout on any news relating to the work of 
the British Naval airships employed on anti-submarine patrols in the North Sea and 
English Channel.  For example, due to censorship, the Northcliffe press could not 
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report on the impeccable safety record of British airships. Throughout the war British 
airships had flown approximately 89,000 hours covering a distance of over 2.25 
million miles,357  losing a mere 44 out of a total of 232358 airships, to all causes. 
However, although this could not be revealed until after the War, The Times had 
however, been able to reveal the existence of a new British “Zeppelin” in 1917,359 
possibly in order to demonstrate British progress in this field of aviation to both the 
British Public and foreign Governments. 
The contrast between the Zeppelin and Gotha raids, in terms of numbers of 
casualties compared to aircraft lost,360 was not explicitly spelled out to the press or 
general public until 1925. Although tables published in the papers at the time did 
include casualty figures for raids as well as listing the losses suffered by the 
attackers. By 1918 the government and in particular the newly formed Royal Air 
Force, had already concluded that the only way to prevent an aerial attack on Britain 
was to possess an aeroplane based bomber force equal or superior to that of any 
other European power. As the Zeppelin was not regarded as being a successful 
strategic bomber the Royal Air Force did not have a vested interest in continuing 
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airship development. By contrast as John Swinfield explains,361 the airship was more 
closely associated with the Royal Navy and its development would have weakened 
the Air Ministry’s claim over naval aviation, potentially threatening the continuing 
independence of the RAF.362 
As was explained in chapter four, these factors combined with the financial crisis of 
the early 1920’s led the Air Ministry and Royal Air Force to prioritize the aeroplane 
over all other forms of aviation basing their judgment on military utility rather than 
on commercial viability. While the Northcliffe led press continued to push for 
developments in all forms of aviation, the main focus was on the development of 
civil aviation. Especially links between far flung corners of the British Empire, for 
which, according to The Times and other advocates of the airship such as Charles 
Dennistoun Burney,363 the range and comfort of the airship arguably provided the 
best compromise between the speed of the aeroplane and the comfort and 
reliability of the ocean liner. This had been demonstrated in the successful flight of 
the R.34 to America and back in July 1919 as well as by the achievements of other 
British airships such as the NS.11 and R.36. However, the high levels of publicity 
devoted to aviation in the press also ensured that accidents such as the loss of the 
NS.11 in a lightning strike and the collapse of the R.38 over Hull were reported in 
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detail to a public which could still remember the violent destruction of German 
Zeppelins.  
5.2 The influence of the Press. 
Throughout the period covered in this dissertation I have attempted to map the 
influence of the press on technological matters. My finding is that this influence 
varied greatly, depending on such contingencies as the topic being covered and the 
level of political support from senior politicians and military commanders such as 
Lloyd George. Prior to the First World War while the Northcliffe press had been an 
outspoken advocate of aviation, it appeared to have very little influence over 
government decisions to support the development of either aircraft or aeroplanes. 
Nevertheless, it is evident that the support of Northcliffe and his press empire was 
sought and appreciated by the government on certain issues such as aviation. This 
was demonstrated in 1909 when Haldane secured Lord Northcliffe’s support for the 
proposed Special Committee for Aeronautics.  
The importance of political support is evident in the reporting of the Shell Crisis by 
the Daily Mail and The Times during 1915. While the initial reaction to this included 
people burning copies of the Daily Mail in the streets, the campaign was successful in 
improving munitions production and eventually resulted in the fall of the Asquith 
Government in December 1916.364 This was the highpoint of Northcliffe’s influence 
                                            
364 For a more complete discussion of the Shells Crisis see: 
Fraser, P 1983. The British "shells scandal" of 1915. Canadian Journal of History/Annales Canadiennes 
d'Histoire, 18(1), 69.  
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and it is clear that it was made possible through political connections that were able 
to protect his Newspapers from the Press Bureau. 
 In contrast to this the Northcliffe press’s influence on aviation during the war, 
particularly in its effect on the perception of the airship, appears to have been largely 
indirect or unplanned. Due to the operation of the Press Bureau and the high level of 
secrecy surrounding the Royal Navy’s airship force, the papers were rarely able to 
provide a positive account of British airship activities during the war. Instead most 
stories focused on the destruction caused by the German Zeppelins, or the 
destruction of the Zeppelins by British fighters or artillery.  
In the period immediately after the First World War Northcliffe’s interest in aviation 
and his passionate belief in its importance to the British Empire was demonstrated 
by the immense number of articles published in The Times on the potential of the 
airship for long distance flights, although, It is difficult to assess the impact of this on 
government decisions. However, a closer study of Lord Northcliffe’s biography for 
this period365 does indicate that he no longer enjoyed the same level of influence 
with Lloyd George as he had during the First World War. While it is possible that  The 
Times influenced the deliberations of the 1921 Imperial Conference in favour of 
retaining airships to develop some form of Imperial Air Route, the dramatic loss of 
the R.38 in August 1921 along with the increasing financial pressure on the British 
government and the armed forces in particular proved to be more significant than 
Northcliffe’s partisan press. 
                                            
365 Thompson 2000. 
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5.3 The implications and further research. 
As Curran and Seaton have noted, since the late nineteenth century the newspaper 
press became a powerful tool able to shape public opinion, influence which political 
party was in power, and on occasion to shape and steer official policy. Lord 
Northcliffe had realised this and frequently attempted to use his newspapers to 
influence and shape British society, not least its means of defence and 
transportation. This is something that has also been recognised by politicians who 
have attempted to gain the support of the press in order to promote their own ideals 
and policies. However, my dissertation demonstrates that the specific effects of the 
press’s intervention did not always arise directly from Northcliffe’s intentions. 
Despite his support for the airship as a means of transport, the negative imagery 
surrounding airships endures to this day, in part due to the close association of 
Zeppelin with all airships regardless of the type of airship as demonstrated by the 
Times during the First World War.366 
This thesis has also highlighted the difficulties in demonstrating the ability of the 
press to influence government decision making or public opinion. Most politicians 
are unlikely to publically admit to being influenced by newspaper reports and any 
correlation between a decision being made and the reports and articles published in 
any particular newspaper are purely circumstantial. While it may be possible to use 
personal writings such as journals and memoirs to reveal a politician’s motivations 
and feelings on a particular subject  it should be remembered that most politicians 
                                            
366 See Ch. 3.7. 
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write journals and memoirs with the eventual aim of publication or at least an 
awareness of their historical interest. One possible avenue of research would be to 
examine the writings of family members or personal assistants such Northcliffe’s 
personal secretary Louise Owen. However, these writings also suffer from a degree 
of personal bias towards the figure or topic being studied.  
Finally there is the difficulty of establishing the level of impact of the press on public 
opinion. To a certain extent this can be gauged through careful reading of letters to 
the editor. However, it should be noted that the papers do not publish all the letters 
received and will tend to publish those which either directly or indirectly support the 
papers stance on a particular topic. In addition to which, it is currently unclear as to 
whether unpublished letters are retained and for how long. One final means of 
analysing public reactions would also be to examine private diaries and journals, 
although this approach suffers from the difficulties involved in accessing and 
verifying the authenticity of these documents, many of which may not have been 
retained by families. 
In order to carry this study further a detailed examination of these sources would be 
required and I am confident that doing so would demonstrate the power of the press 
to influence both government decisions and public opinion developing technologies 
such as the choice between aeroplanes and airships. However, this would require a 
great deal more time than was available for this study. 
While it is unclear to what extent Lord Northcliffe succeeded in influencing the fate 
of the airship in; it is clear that he was highly influential and personally believed in 
the ability of the press to influence both the government and public opinion. 
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Throughout his career Northcliffe wrote more words in The Times and Daily Mail 
than he spoke in the House of Lords. This preference for operating outside of the 
government is reflected in the recollections of his personal secretary about his 
exclusion from the peace conference following the war. “Had [Northcliffe] taken part 
in the Peace Conference himself, his newspapers would have suffered; he could not 
have published what he heard, and he could best serve our Empire as an 
onlooker.”367 
  
                                            
367 Owen 1922, p.48. 
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Appendix A 
 
List of Members of the Aeronautical Sub-Committee of the Committee 
of Imperial Defence 1909-10 
 
The Right Honourable Lord Rayleigh, O.M., F.R.8. (President) 
Dr. R. T. Glazebrook, F.R.S. (Chairman). 
Rear-Admiral R. IT. Bacon, C.V.O., R.N. 
Mr. Horace Darwin, F.R.S. 
Sir G. Greenhill, F.H.S. 
Major-General Sir C. F. Hadden, K C.B. 
Mr. F. W. Lanchester. 
Mr. II. R. A. Mallock, F.R.S. 
Mr. Mervyn O'Gorman. 
Professor J. E. Petavel, F.R.S. 
Dr. W. N. Shaw, F.R.S. 
Capt. Murray F. Sueter. R.N. 
Secretary, Mr. F. J. Selby, 
Bushy House, Teddington, Middlesex. 
Taken from the Report Of the ADVISORY COMMITTEE FOR AERONAUTICS FOR THE YEAR 
1909-10. 
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Appendix B 
 
The Defence of the Realm Act (DORA) August 1914 (4 and 5 Geo.V c.29) 
 
As Tania Rose (1995) notes, by 28 February 1917 “there were 400 pages of 
consolidated regulations.” Which covered most aspects of public activity; however, 
only a handful of these directly affected the operation of the Press, regulations 18, 
27, 27C, 51, 51A, and 56, only two of which apply to this study. 
For further information see Tania Rose’s Aspects of Political Censorship 1914-1918, 
pages 107-110. 
Regulation 18: Prohibited the collection of any information, military or naval, of 
possible use to an enemy. 
Regulation 27: Prohibited the spreading of false or prejudicial reports intended to 
cause dissatisfaction, interfere with the prosecution of the war, prejudice the 
government’s relations with foreign powers or prejudice the recruitment training, 
discipline or administration of H.M. forces. 
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